1980s, the Siles Zuazo administration sought the support of the Nonaligned Movement at its conference in Managua. Although Bolivia secured multilateral support for its claim, international pressure produced few results. In fact, Chile refused to deal with Bolivia unless multilateral organizations such as the Nonaligned Movement and the OAS were excluded from the negotiations.

Relations with Chile changed following the election of Paz Estenssoro. Bedregal met on a regular basis with his Chilean counterpart to negotiate an outlet for Bolivia. Bedregal proposed the creation of a sovereign strip sixteen kilometers wide that would run north of the city of Arica and parallel to the Peruvian border. The tone of the negotiations suggested that an agreement was imminent.

On June 10, 1987, however, Chile rejected Bedregal's proposal, sending shock waves through the Bolivian government. The confidence of the Paz Estenssoro government was seriously shaken by this foreign policy defeat, especially after so much emphasis had been placed on its success. Bolivians were, however, swept by another wave of anti-Chilean nationalism in support of the government. Members of Bolivia's civic organizations spontaneously imposed a symbolic boycott of Chilean products. Relations with Chile were again suspended, and little hope for any improvement in the near future remained.

Relations with Argentina and Brazil, in contrast, showed improvement. A bond of solidarity developed among the three nations owing to their common dilemma of trying to democratize in the midst of deep economic recessions. Tensions arose, however, over Argentina's inability to pay for its purchases of Bolivian natural gas. United States intervention on Bolivia's behalf provided some relief to the Bolivian economy. Although by early 1989 Argentina still owed over US$100 million, a joint accord reached in November 1988 reduced tension. Revenue from natural gas sales was crucial for the success of the new economic model adopted in 1985. Hence, Argentina's discontinuance of purchases of Bolivian natural gas in 1992 when the sales agreement was due to expire could prove to be catastrophic.

Fortunately, Bolivia signed important trade agreements with Brazil in 1988 and 1989. Brazil agreed to purchase approximately 3 million cubic meters of Bolivian natural gas per day beginning in the early to mid-1990s (see Petroleum and Natural Gas, ch. 3). The sales were projected to yield approximately US$373 million annually to the Bolivian economy. Brazil also agreed to help Bolivia build a thermoelectric plant and produce fertilizers and polymers. Finally, Bolivia and Brazil signed an agreement for the suppression

of drug traffickers, the rehabilitation of addicts, and control over chemicals used in the manufacturing of drugs.

Membership in International Organizations

Latin American integration was a major tenet of Bolivian foreign policy largely because Bolivia recognized its severe geographic limitations. As mentioned earlier, Bolivia participated actively in the Amazonian Pact, Ancom, and the Río de la Plata Basin commercial and development agreement in the late 1980s. In fact, Bolivia was the only country in Latin America that could boast membership in all three of these organizations. Bolivia was also a charter member of the OAS and, as noted previously, was active in SELA and ALADI.

Bolivia was a founding member of the UN. In the 1980s, the UN served as a forum for several of Bolivia's demands, including its claims against Chile for access to the Pacific Ocean. In the late 1980s, the UN also provided cooperation on debt-relief programs and advice on coca eradication programs.

Like those of other nations in Latin America, Bolivia's economy was closely scrutinized by the IMF, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Although its credit rating had been adversely affected by nonpayment of loans to private banks since 1985, Bolivia managed to restore its credibility, and the IMF and other lending agencies reopened credit lines.

* * *

Until recently very little literature in English was available on contemporary Bolivian politics. For information on Bolivia's governmental system and politics, readers may consult the following publications of James M. Malloy and Eduardo A. Gamarra: *Revolution and Reaction;* "Bolivia 1985–1987" in Abraham Lowenthal's *Latin America and Caribbean Contemporary Record;* and "The Transition to Democracy in Bolivia" in Malloy and Mitchell A. Seligson's *Authoritarians and Democrats.* Other useful books include William H. Brill's *Military Intervention in Bolivia;* James Dunkerley's historical work, *Rebellion in the Veins;* Jonathan Kelley and Herbert S. Klein's *Revolution and the Rebirth of Inequality;* Klein's *Bolivia: The Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic Society;* Jerry R. Ladman's multidisciplinary study, *Modern Day Bolivia;* Malloy's *Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution;* Christopher Mitchell's excellent *The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia;* and Rodolfo Salinas Pérez's *La reconquista de la democracia.*

Bolivian foreign relations are discussed in Alberto Crespo Gutiérrez's "Prioridades de la política exterior Boliviana" and Jorge

Escobari Cusicanqui's "Enunciados para una política internacional Boliviana," both in *Relaciones Internacionales*. Additional relevant materials include Gamarra's "Democratization and Foreign Policy" and "The United States, Democracy, and the War on Drugs in Bolivia." (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

Chapter 5. National Security



A winged human figure with condor symbols on the body of the Great Idol of Tiwanaku

THE ARMED FORCES OF BOLIVIA, principally the army, traditionally have played a central role in the nation's politics, intervening frequently and ruling arbitrarily. The influence of the military in politics predominated for most of the nineteenth century, from the revolt against Spain in 1809 until the ignominious defeat of the armed forces by Chile in the War of the Pacific in 1880. With a few exceptions, civilian leaders governed the country until 1936, when the military, angered by their humiliating defeat by Paraguay in the Chaco War (1932–35), which they blamed on inept civilian leadership, ousted the civilian president who had led the country into the disastrous war.

The 1952 Revolution reestablished civilian rule. Its leaders, members of the ruling Nationalist Revolutionary Movement, stopped short of completely disbanding Bolivia's army, however, when they realized that only it could control the increasingly militant peasants' and miners' militias. Although the leaders of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement tried to keep the military subordinate, its power continued to increase. The force of military tradition eventually prevailed as the military seized power in 1964. From then until 1982, Bolivia had eleven military governments. With its reputation at a low point as a result of the corrupt and brutal dictatorship of General Luis García Meza Tejada (1980–81), the military returned to the barracks in 1982.

A civilian president, democratically elected in 1980, was finally able to take office in 1982. By decade's end, Bolivia was still under democratic rule, and a more professional military had emerged. It had dissociated itself from García Meza and purged its ranks of many officers who had been implicated in narcotics trafficking. Moreover, it had not reverted to its traditional pattern of intervention and coups.

Bolivian-United States military relations improved considerably in the second half of the 1980s, when the United States once again became the principal source of foreign military assistance. In 1985, after an eight-year suspension, the United States renewed military aid. Although Bolivia did not have a guerrilla insurgency problem, joint Bolivian-United States counterinsurgency exercises were held in the eastern lowlands on two occasions, in 1986 and 1987, but public criticism forced the cancellation of the one scheduled for 1988. Nevertheless, United States military assistance continued, and some major civic-action projects were undertaken in 1989.

As the world's second largest source of cocaine, after Peru, Bolivia had a major problem in the 1980s with narcotics trafficking and the accompanying violence, corruption, and drug abuse. Because it was the destination for an estimated 80 percent of Bolivian cocaine, the United States began providing significant assistance to the antidrug efforts of Bolivia's security forces. Special Bolivian antinarcotics police were created under a 1983 Bolivian-United States antidrug agreement. United States military personnel and equipment were used in Bolivia during the joint Bolivian-United States Operation Blast Furnace. The controversial operation marked the first time that the United States had committed military troops to a narcotics-control mission on foreign soil.

Drug trafficking also became an increasing concern for Bolivian national security in the late 1980s, as wealthy traffickers, including Colombia's Medellín Cartel, lobbied for the Bolivian cocaine industry. This lobbying included bribing, intimidating, and assassinating government, judicial, military, and security officials; contributing to and discrediting political parties; instigating and financing militant demonstrations by coca growers; and developing ties with local guerrilla or paramilitary groups. To counter these efforts, the 1985–89 government of Víctor Paz Estenssoro signed another agreement with the United States in 1987. Paz Estenssoro subsequently revamped the antinarcotics structure and, in 1988, adopted a stringent antidrug law, which met with militant opposition from the organized, coca-cultivating peasantry in Cochabamba and Beni departments.

The Paz Estenssoro government also took steps to reform the overburdened judicial system, which was frequently corrupted by narcotics traffickers. In addition to dismissing a number of judges suspected of taking bribes, the government in 1988 created thirteen special courts to expedite the prosecution of drug traffickers and the confiscation of their assets.

Evolution of the Military Role in Society and Government

Early History

Bolivia's pattern of military revolts was established soon after independence in 1825, as one economic elite or another promoted its interests by backing a particular general or colonel. Soon after taking office, Marshal Andrés de Santa Cruz y Calahumana (1829–39) created an armed forces command and organized an army of between 5,000 and 10,000 members; he also established the Military Academy (Colegio Militar) in 1835. The army was reorganized

in 1839 following its decisive defeat by Chile in the Battle of Yungay and divided into regular and paramilitary forces. Six years of military service became obligatory for single men. After soundly defeating the 5,400-member invading Peruvian forces in the Battle of Ingaví outside La Paz in 1841, Bolivia's army, with 4,100 members, was reduced to between 1,500 and 2,000 men.

At the outbreak of the disastrous War of the Pacific in 1879, the army consisted of 690 officers and 2,165 other ranks, but it was able to mobilize about 12,100 men. Nevertheless, the Chileans easily defeated Bolivia's unprepared army, which had been weakened by years of declining military budgets. The Chilean armed forces killed 5,000 Bolivian troops at Tacna on May 26, 1880, under the command of General Narcisco Campero Leyes (see War of the Pacific, ch. 1). Although the incipient Bolivian naval force had played no role in the war, it lost its three warships and Bolivia's four Pacific Coast ports. Henceforth, Bolivian boats were limited to navigating Lake Titicaca and Bolivia's lowland rivers.

Postwar leaders attempted to create a more professional army. General Campero (1880–84), Bolivia's leading, European-trained army officer, removed its discredited older officers. Aniceto Arce Ruiz (1888–92) reopened the Military Academy in 1891 (closed since 1847), under the command of a Bolivian graduate of France's War School. The academy relocated from Sucre to La Paz in 1899. Arce also initiated a draft service and established the "Sergeant Maximiliano Paredes" Noncommissioned Officers School (Escuela de Clases "Sargento Maximiliano Paredes"—EC), in 1900. Despite these advances, the army was unable to defeat the secessionist movement in Acre (1900–1903), and Bolivia ceded the territory to Brazil in 1903 (see fig. 3).

The Bolivian government sought European help in reorganizing its army. As a result, the principal foreign influences on the army in the early twentieth century were French and German. In 1905 Bolivia contracted with a five-member French military mission, which, over the next four years, established a rudimentary armed forces General Staff (Estado Mayor General—EMG), a Staff College (Colegio del Estado Mayor—CEM), and a Reserve Officers School (Escuela de Oficiales de la Reserva). From 1911 until the outbreak of World War I, an eighteen-member German military mission directed the Military Academy and trained and advised the army, giving it a Prussian look but failing to enhance its military efficiency. Cut off from European sources of equipment and advice during the war, the army stagnated.

Some German military advisers returned after the war, and one, General Hans Kundt, was named EMG chief in 1921, minister

of national defense in 1925, and again EMG chief in 1931 (he was dismissed shortly thereafter for interfering in politics). During that period, Bolivia's military made some progress. By 1923 Bolivia had created the Aviation Corps (Cuerpo de Aviación). It was expanded two years later into a military aviation service that included the "Germán Busch" Military Aviation Academy (Colegio Militar de Aviación "Germán Busch"—Colmilav).

In 1924 the army was reorganized into divisions, each with six regiments. Under President Hernando Siles Reyes (1926-30), the army implemented a new organizational statute, established military zones, and reformed the curriculum of the Military Academy and CEM. It also established the Army Health Organization. Despite the improvements, the army was unable to defend Bolivia's borders when two years of mounting tension over the northern part of the Chaco region erupted into war with Paraguay in December 1932 (see The Chaco War, ch. 1).

The Legacy of the Chaco War

From the outset of the Chaco War (1932-35), Bolivia's Aviation Corps—with forty-nine aircraft, including twenty-eight combat aircraft—established aerial superiority, flying frequent tactical support and bombing missions. Its transport element also was active in supplying the troops in the combat zone. Once mobilized, Bolivia's army consisted of nine divisions and more than 12,000 troops, a number that later rose to 25,000. However, in addition to being ill equipped, poorly supplied, and disastrously led, the army consisted largely of homesick, bewildered highland Indians (*indios*) from the Altiplano (highland plateau) who had been conscripted or impressed into service. They fought stubbornly and stoically, but the more resourceful, better-led, and determined Paraguayans, with a mobilized force of 24,000, gradually pushed them back.

Throughout the Chaco War, Bolivia's army Staff (Estado Mayor—EM) feuded with the civilian leadership. The civil-military relationship deteriorated, creating a legacy of bitterness that continued into the postwar period. The war was a humiliating defeat for Bolivia, as well as for its German-trained army. Of a total of 250,000 Bolivian troops mobilized, as many as 65,000 were killed. Moreover, Bolivia not only had to give up most of the Chaco territory but also spent the equivalent of some US$200 million in its war effort, nearly bankrupting the already impoverished nation.

As a consequence of the debacle in the Chaco, Bolivia's army became more politically aware and ready to act as an institution in pursuit of its own political goals. It began by deposing Daniel

Salamanca Urey (1931-34), the elitist president who had led the country into its disastrous foreign war. For the first time since 1880, the army returned to power. Although both Bolivia and Paraguay were required by the terms of the armistice to reduce their armies to 5,000 men, Bolivia circumvented the restriction by creating a military police "legion" as an unofficial extension of the army.

After the restrictions of the armistice lapsed with the signing by both countries of a peace treaty in 1938, Bolivia built up its battered army. The army retained its basic prewar organization, although units formerly assigned to the Chaco were necessarily relocated. In an effort to professionalize the military, the regime of Colonel David Toro Ruilova (1936-37) invited an Italian military mission to establish two military academies in Bolivia: the Superior War School (Escuela Superior de Guerra—ESG), the former CEM in La Paz for EMG officers; and the "Marshal José Ballivián" School of Arms (Escuela de Aplicación de Armas "Mariscal José Ballivián"—EAA) in Cochabamba, primarily for junior officers. The new schools provided instruction for the first time in such subjects as sociology and political science. Nevertheless, the Italian missions, along with other military missions from Spain and Czechoslovakia in the 1920s and 1930s, had little impact on Bolivia's Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas—FF.AA.).

During this period, Bolivia and the United States also established close military cooperation for the first time. Beginning in 1941 and 1942, United States aviation and military missions were active in Bolivia, and the country began receiving limited military aid under the wartime Lend-Lease Agreement. The United States air mission reorganized the Aviation Corps into the Bolivian Air Force (Fuerza de Aviación Boliviana—FAB), which remained subordinate to the army.

Despite gradual improvements in professional standards, the military remained a traditional institution for decades after the Chaco War. The officer corps—divided and fractionalized by interservice rivalry, personal ambitions, differing ideological and geographical perspectives, and generational differences—was alternately dominated by reformists and conservatives. The reformist military regimes of three colonels—Toro, Germán Busch Becerra (1937-39), and Gualberto Villarroel López (1943-46)—all contributed to the polarization of the officer corps along generational and ideological lines. The conservative business leaders who took power in 1946 attempted to reverse the trend of military control of government by having military courts try more than 100 field-grade and junior officers for political activities proscribed by the constitution of 1947; many were convicted and discharged from the army.

Reorganization of the Armed Forces, 1952–66

The 1952 Revolution neutralized the army politically for a dozen years and redefined the military's role in society. Distrustful of the army, Paz Estenssoro's Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario—MNR) government (1952–56) immediately formed armed *milicias populares* (popular militias) composed of campesinos, miners, and factory workers. The militias in effect replaced the army and by 1953 were the strongest armed forces in the country. Instead of abolishing the army, which the MNR leaders soon realized was indispensable, the government largely demobilized and reorganized it. The government also reduced the army in size from approximately 20,000 to 5,000 members, downgraded it in status, and slashed the military budget. In addition, the MNR imposed party control over the army by establishing *células militares* (military cells) and requiring the military to take an oath to the party. Author Charles D. Corbett estimates that no more than 300 officers actually were discharged or exiled, leaving 1,000 officers in the smaller army. He notes, however, that most senior officers were purged from the service.

Paz Estenssoro succeeded in dominating the army, which exercised relatively little influence as an independent political force. It became involved primarily in civic-action projects, particularly in helping to colonize frontier areas. Other than establishing additional engineer units, the army made little progress in developing militarily. Under Paz Estenssoro, the defense budget fell from 22 percent of government expenditures in 1952 to 6.7 percent in 1957. Although the Paz Estenssoro government closed the Military Academy for a year, it kept open the School of Arms and the "Marshal Andrés de Santa Cruz" Command and Staff School (Escuela de Comando y Estado Mayor "Mariscal Andrés de Santa Cruz"—ECEM), which had replaced the ESG in Cochabamba in 1950. Paz Estenssoro also formally established the "General José Manuel Pando" School of Military Engineering (Escuela de Ingeniería Militar "General José Manuel Pando"—EIM), which had already begun operating in La Paz in 1950. In addition to reestablishing the Military Academy in 1954, Bolivia began sending a few officers to attend the School of the Americas (Escuela de las Américas) in Panama.

As the army declined, the militias grew in strength. By the end of Paz Estenssoro's first term in 1956, the militias numbered between 50,000 and 70,000 men. The Paz Estenssoro government also thoroughly reorganized the police force, giving it more responsibility than the military (see The Security Forces, this ch.).

The MNR government of Hernán Siles Zuazo (1956–60 and 1982–85), uneasy about having to depend on the goodwill of the increasingly militant militias, began rebuilding the FF.AA. with the idea of keeping the force subordinate to the civilian government and involved primarily in civic-action projects (see Civic Action, this ch.). Historian Robert J. Alexander cites two additional reasons why the MNR government decided to revive the military. First, the government wanted to make use of the docile Indians, who, accustomed to being conscripted at the age of eighteen, continued to present themselves to authorities for induction. Second, the government probably felt pressured by the United States to reestablish the regular armed forces and believed that increased United States economic aid was contingent on doing so. In an effort to ensure that the new military would remain loyal, the civilian government gave preference in command appointments and promotions to military officers of known pro-MNR sympathies and permitted members of the lower class to enter the Military Academy. As the MNR government became increasingly dependent on the army to control unrest, the military began to acquire some political influence.

In 1956 United States military instructors began teaching at the Military Academy. With the beginning of United States military assistance to Bolivia in 1958, military expenditures rose sharply and steadily. The United States also helped to strengthen the military with training and technical assistance. The army created an additional two divisions, raising the total to eight. The FAB, which became independent of the army in 1957, assumed responsibility for air defense, including the operation of antiaircraft artillery units.

Although a landlocked country, Bolivia established a nascent naval force in the early 1960s when it acquired four patrol boats from the United States. The River and Lake Force (Fuerza Fluvial y Lacustre) was created in January 1963 under the Ministry of National Defense. It consisted of 1,800 personnel recruited largely from the army. Bolivia's naval force was rechristened the Bolivian Naval Force (Fuerza Naval Boliviana) in January 1966, but it also has been called the Bolivian Navy (Armada Boliviana).

In his second term (1960–64), Paz Estenssoro continued the military buildup and made determined efforts to improve the training and equipment of the FF.AA., while preventing the militias from rearming. New military schools helped to improve the military's professional standards. The establishment of two new military organizations indicated the military's growing political influence. One was the School of High Military Studies (Escuela de Altos Estudios Militares—EAEM), inaugurated in 1960 to educate senior

civilian and military leaders on strategic issues affecting Bolivia. The EAEM was later renamed the School of High National Studies (Escuela de Altos Estudios Nacionales—EAEN), or National War College. The other was the Supreme Council of National Defense (Consejo Supremo de Defensa Nacional—CSDN), formed in 1961 as "the highest advisory body charged with problems of national defense." According to Corbett, the Supreme Council—which included the president, vice president, cabinet, chairmen of congressional committees, and the military high command—provided a structure for the FF.AA. to present its viewpoints on any national defense-related issue.

By 1964 the army had increased to 15,000 members, and the military budget had grown to 14 percent of the national budget. Although the strength of the militias had dropped to about 16,000 men by early 1963, the militias had not been replaced by an entirely apolitical army. Actually, by rebuilding the army Paz Estenssoro had unintentionally strengthened its political role, for its younger officers had few personal ties with the MNR political leadership.

After leading a successful military coup against Paz Estenssoro in November 1964, FAB General René Barrientos Ortuño immediately abolished the military cells that he, ironically, had headed. An elite nucleus of officers trained in the career school rose to power along with Barrientos (president, 1964–65; copresident, May 1965–January 1966; and president, 1966–69). Beginning with Barrientos's coup, the military reemerged as a factor in Bolivian politics and would remain the dominant power in government until 1982. Although still fractionalized, it was the strongest and most important institution in Bolivia. The relative status of the military was illustrated by author James Dunkerley's observation that between 1964 and 1966 the monthly pay of an army lieutenant rose to more than twice the average annual per capita income (US$120) and quadruple the salary of the highest grade of teacher.

General Alfredo Ovando Candía (copresident, May 1965–January 1966, and president, January–August 1966 and 1969–70) became the most articulate advocate of a new, professional role for the army. Ovando is generally credited with modernizing the military by deemphasizing its traditional role and transforming it into an instrument of development and production. The Generational Group (Grupo Generacional), formed in 1965 and consisting of a few young, professionally oriented, reform-minded officers, also advocated a nationalistic program of reducing foreign influence in Bolivia and diversifying the economy.

The Counterinsurgency Decade

Historian Herbert S. Klein notes that a counterinsurgency policy to combat "internal subversion" became a major theme of United States training for the Bolivian army. In 1963 Argentine-trained Bolivian officers established the Center of Instruction for Special Troops (Centro de Instrucción para Tropas Especiales—CITE) under the Seventh Division in Cochabamba. In addition, by the end of 1963 Bolivia had more graduates from the United States Army Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, than any other Latin American country. A total of 659 Bolivian officers received training at the School of the Americas in 1962–63, and 20 of the 23 senior Bolivian officers attended or visited the school during 1963–64. United States military aid increased from US$100,000 in 1958 to US$3.2 million in 1964. This aid, which included weapons and training outside Bolivia, enabled Paz Estenssoro to strengthen the army more extensively than MNR leaders originally had intended. According to Klein, Paz Estenssoro constantly justified rearming the military to the United States "as a means of preventing communist subversion."

In March 1967, Bolivia became a prime target of Cuban-supported subversion when Ernesto "Che" Guevara and his tiny National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional—ELN) launched a guerrilla campaign. Despite its increased United States training, Bolivia's army still consisted mostly of untrained Indian conscripts and had fewer than 2,000 troops ready for combat. Therefore, while the army kept the 40-man guerrilla group contained in a southwestern area of the country, an 800-man Ranger force began training in counterinsurgency methods. With counterinsurgency instructors from the United States Southern Command (Southcom) headquarters in Panama, the army established a Ranger School in Santa Cruz Department. By late July 1967, three well-trained and well-equipped Bolivian Ranger battalions were ready for action. Supported by these special troops, units of the Eighth Division closed in on Guevara's demoralized, ill-equipped, and poorly supplied band. Guevara's capture and summary execution on October 7 ended the ill-fated, Cuban-sponsored insurgency.

The army's increased capabilities and its decisive defeat of the legendary Cuban guerrilla leader enhanced its prestige. The fact that Barrientos's vice president, Luis Adolfo Siles Salinas, a conservative civilian, had to request permission from the military high command to assume his mandate after Barrientos's death in April 1969 indicated how powerful the army had become as an institution.

Military Intervention in Politics, 1970–85

Until 1970 reformist factions in the military had remained small and had gained significant influence only during the Barrientos administration. By 1970 the military's reformist faction, the Generational Group, had about 100 members, most of them young officers. Historian Maria Luise Wagner postulates that the rise of Juan José Torres González to the presidency (1970–71) marked the culmination of a reformist trend in the FF.AA. that had begun in 1936. The trend, however, reemerged in late 1978 when another reformist, David Padilla Arancibia (1978–79), who was favored by junior officers, took power (see Revolutionary Nationalism: Ovando and Torres, ch. 1).

According to Klein, under General Hugo Banzer Suárez (1971–78) "the role of the military was seen as one of protection of the upper classes and their middle-class allies, within non-democratic regimes." Thus, military intervention was regarded as "a long-term alternative to open politics." Although military cooperation with the United States grew considerably and the military budget increased under Banzer's rule, the United States suspended military aid to Bolivia in late 1977 because of the regime's authoritarianism.

During the García Meza regime (1980–81), so many top officers were alleged to be involved in corruption and drug trafficking that both foreign and Bolivian officials called it "the cocaine government." As de facto president, García Meza angered many officers by promoting a number of undistinguished colleagues—whose only merit appeared to be a record of loyalty to him—to top army positions. García Meza resigned and left the country in September 1981, and the military finally stepped aside in October 1982 to allow the National Congress (hereafter, Congress) to reconvene and Siles Zuazo to begin serving out his truncated second term as president (October 1982 to August 1985).

Three coup attempts against Siles Zuazo by dissident officers in June and December 1984 and January 1985 were thwarted because the military, increasingly commanded by younger, more professional officers, remained loyal to the government. The military also honored the constitutional transfer of power to Paz Estenssoro in August 1985 for a four-year term in office (see Political Forces and Interest Groups, ch. 4).

The Armed Forces

Mission and Organization

The fundamental mission of the FF.AA. is to defend and preserve national independence, security, stability, sovereignty, and honor; ensure the rule of the Constitution; guarantee the stability of the

legally constituted government; and cooperate in the national development of the country. According to the 1967 Constitution, military personnel may not deliberate on or perform any political action, although this provision was often disobeyed in the past. In 1989 the FF.AA.—consisting of the military high command and the army, air force, and navy—totaled 28,000 members. Conscripts accounted for about 19,000 armed forces members (army, 15,000; navy, 1,800; and FAB, 2,200).

The Constitution makes the president of the republic head of the military, with the title of captain general of the armed forces (see fig. 12). The president appoints the commander in chief of the FF.AA., the chiefs of staff of the three military services, and other commanding officers. The president also proposes military promotions to Congress. Operational command of the FF.AA. is exercised jointly by the chiefs of staff through the Committee of Chiefs of Staff, a component of the EMG. Using other military-related presidential powers, the president may declare—with the approval of the Council of Ministers—a state of siege to deal with an emergency situation, but for a period not to exceed ninety days, except with the consent of Congress (see The Executive, ch. 4). Under a state of siege, the chief executive may increase the FF.AA., call up the reserves, collect taxes, or negotiate loans. In 1986 the Paz Estenssoro government declared a state of siege to counter strikes by mineworkers and teachers; Congress approved a ninety-day extension. President Jaime Paz Zamora (1989-) gave orders to the FF.AA., on administrative matters only, through the minister of national defense (for the army, navy, and air force). Headed by the president, the CSDN also serves as a body through which senior military officers advise the president and cabinet on national security matters.

Another national security decisionmaking body, the National Security Council (Consejo Nacional de Seguridad—Conase), was under the EMG. In early 1989, Conase was directed by a general, who headed its Permanent Secretariat (Secretario Permanente).

Under the Paz Zamora government, the minister of national defense was responsible for administrative supervision of the FF.AA. On technical matters and in the event of war, the military receives orders through the commander in chief of the FF.AA., a position that has been rotated among the three services every two years. Each service is headed by a commander, aided by a chief of staff (Jefe del Estado Mayor) and an inspector general.

In November 1988, the military was pressing for constitutional reforms, involving nonmilitary as well as specifically military provisions. Proposals included defining the armed forces as "the



Figure 12. Organization of the Armed Forces, 1989

fundamental institution of the state, charged with the mission of preserving Bolivia's national independence, sovereignty and honor, territorial integrity, peace, and internal and external security; guaranteeing the stability of the legally constituted government; and cooperating in the integral development of the country." Several leading politicians saw the reference to the internal security role as a backdoor attempt to reintroduce the national security doctrine that they claimed inspired most of the military coups.

The Ministry of National Defense was organized into a ministerial cabinet (*gabinete ministerial*) headed by the minister of national defense. Within the ministry were five general directorates: administration and budgets, logistics, territory, planning, and internal management control. In addition to the directorates were the Subsecretariat of Maritime Interests, the National Directorate of Civil Defense, six military regions, and sixteen dependency divisions.

Army

The army had a reported 20,200 members in 1989, including some 15,000 conscripts. Its equipment consisted mainly of light tanks, armored personnel carriers, towed artillery, and recoilless rifles (see table 16, Appendix).

There were six military regions (*regiones militares*—RMs) in the army. RM 1, headquartered in La Paz, encompassed most of La Paz Department. RM 2, headquartered in Sucre, included Cochabamba Department and most of Chuquisaca Department. RM 3, based in Tarija, consisted of Tarija Department and eastern Chuquisaca and Santa Cruz departments. RM 4, headquartered in Potosí, covered Oruro and Potosí departments. RM 5, based in Trinidad, contained most of Santa Cruz and Beni departments. RM 6, based in Cobija, encompassed Pando Department and parts of La Paz and Beni departments.

The army was organized into ten divisions consisting of eight cavalry regiments: five horse units, two motorized units, and one assault group; one motorized infantry regiment with two battalions; twenty-two infantry battalions, including five infantry assault battalions; three artillery "regiments" (battalions); five artillery batteries, including the Artillery and Antiair Defense Group (Grupo de Artillería y Defensa Antiaérea—GADA); one paratroop battalion; and six engineer battalions. These units included two armed battalions, one mechanized cavalry regiment, and one Presidential Guard (Colorado) infantry regiment under direct control of the army headquarters in the Miraflores district of La Paz.

Division headquarters were located in Cochabamba (the largest), Camiri (Santa Cruz Department), Oruro, Potosí, Riberalta (Beni Department), Roboré (Santa Cruz Department), Santa Cruz, Trinidad, Viacha (La Paz Department), and Villamontes (Tarija Department). In 1987, however, the Ninth Division was established in Rurrenabaque in General José Ballivián Province of Beni Department. Each of the divisions, with the exception of Viacha, occupied a region generally corresponding to the administrative departments, with some overlapping.

The town of Riberalta had three military bases. Two new bases were under construction in 1989 at Puerto Rico, near Riberalta, and at Porvenir, near the Brazilian border. Others, including those in Riberalta and at the departmental capital of Trinidad, were being modernized.

The FF.AA. in the late 1980s continued to be incapable of adequately defending the country's extensive borders with Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Paraguay. If attacked, Bolivia would have to seek assistance from friendly states. It was a member of the Inter-American Defense Board and a signatory of the Inter-American Treaty for Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 (also known as the Rio Treaty). Although no major border conflict had occurred since the Chaco War, Conase was concerned that all of Bolivia's contiguous neighbors had geopolitical objectives that threatened Bolivia's territorial integrity. The intentions of Brazil and Chile were particularly worrisome to Conase.

Navy

Bolivia had a small navy, which in 1989 had approximately 3,800 personnel, including 2,000 naval infantry personnel and marines, as well as about 1,800 conscripts. The navy's small motor launches operated mainly on Lake Titicaca and the numerous navigable rivers of the sparsely populated northeastern portion of the country. The navy's riverine patrol duties included dislodging Brazilian and other foreign gold miners and interdicting smugglers of narcotics and contraband. Its areas of operation were divided into five (or possibly six) naval districts—Lake Titicaca, Río Beni, Río Madre de Dios, Río Mamoré, and Río Paraguay—each with one flotilla. The five naval headquarters were located in Guaqui (on Lake Titicaca's southern shore), Puerto Guayaramerín (on Río Mamoré), Puerto Suárez, Riberalta, and San Pedro de Tiquina (on Lake Titicaca's eastern shore). Other bases were in Puerto Busch, Puerto Horquilla, Puerto Villarroel (on Río Ichilo), Trinidad, and Rurrenabaque. The "Admiral Grau" Marine Infantry Battalion (Batallón de Infantería de Marina "Almirante Grau") was based at the Fourth Naval District, Titicaca, in Tiquina.

In the late 1980s, the navy had several dozen boats in service, including about ten river patrol craft. It received its first United States-built, river-patrol launch, the twenty-meter *Santa Cruz de la Sierra,* in 1985. In 1986 the navy acquired nineteen outboard motors for its five- and six-meter patrol boats, effectively doubling its reconnaissance capability. Bolivia's only seagoing vessel, the *Libertador Bolívar,* was normally docked at Rosario on the Río de la Plata in

La Paz as seen from El Alto
Courtesy Harvey W. Reed

Argentina and was used to and from Bolivian free zones in Argentina and Uruguay. The navy also had two Cessna aircraft (see table 18, Appendix).

Air Force

In 1989 FAB encompassed about 4,000 personnel (including about 2,200 conscripts). Its equipment comprised forty-five combat aircraft and ten armed helicopters (see table 19, Appendix). Although FAB's aircraft were mostly of West European, Brazilian, and United States manufacture, in late 1988 the government was considering the purchase of Soviet cargo aircraft and helicopters.

FAB was under the Ministry of National Defense (it had been under the Ministry of Aeronautics from 1980 to the Paz Zamora administration). FAB was organized into three air brigades with thirteen subordinate air groups. Its nine air bases were located at La Paz, Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, Puerto Suárez, Tarija, Villamontes, Cobija, Riberalta, and Roboré. Major brigade commands included the First Air Brigade (La Paz), Second Air Brigade (Cochabamba), Third Air Brigade (Santa Cruz), and Fourth Air Brigade (also called the Amazonas Air Brigade), created in 1987 and headquartered in the Puerto Suárez area bordering Brazil. The First Air Brigade comprised the Air Fighters Group (Grupo Aéreo Cazador—GAC) 31, Air Transport Groups (Grupos Aéreos de Transporte) 71 and 72, and the National Service of Photogrammetry

(Servicio Nacional de Aerofotogrametría—SNA). GAC-31 received the first six of eighteen T-33A fighter aircraft from the United States in 1985. The Second Air Brigade included Cover Air Groups 41, 51, and 52. The Salvage and Rescue Air Group 51 (Grupo Aéreo de Salvataje y Rescate 51—GASR-51) was created in 1984, although predecessor units had operated since 1960. A similar unit, called the Search and Rescue Group 52 (Grupo Aéreo de Búsqueda y Rescate 52—GABR-52) was established in Cobija in 1987. The Third Air Brigade consisted of Hunter Air Groups 32, 33, and 34, and Training Air Groups (Grupos Aéreos de Entrenamiento—GAE) 21 and 22. GAE-21, which trained cadets of the Colmilav, acquired six T-23 Uirapuru trainer aircraft from Brazil and twelve Cessna A-152 Aerobat aircraft and three ATC-710 flight simulators from the United States in 1986. FAB also had Tactical Air Groups (Grupos Aéreos Tácticos) 61 (in Roboré), 62, and 63 (in Villamontes); the Group of Security and Defense of Air Installations (Grupo de Seguridad y Defensa de Instalaciones Aéreas—GSDIA); and GADA-91, GADA-92, and GADA-93. In March 1989, FAB took a major step toward modernizing its force by inaugurating the General Command Systems Department in La Paz, equipped with sophisticated computers.

Civil Aeronautics

The General Directorate of Civil Aeronautics (Dirección General de Aeronáutica Civil—DGAC), under the direction of FAB (and formerly the Ministry of Aeronautics as well), administered a civil aeronautics school, the National Institute of Civil Aeronautics (Instituto Nacional de Aeronáutica Civil—INAC), and two commercial air transport services: Military Air Transports (Transportes Aéreos Militares—TAM) and Bolivian Air Transports (Transportes Aéreos Bolivianos—TAB). The ministry also controlled the allocation of a large number of small civil aircraft acquired by FAB since the approval in late 1986 of the law on seizure of aircraft not registered at the ministry. INAC, which was headquartered in the Miraflores district of La Paz, graduated eleven new commercial pilots, sixteen maintenance technicians, and three FAB navigators in 1986.

The transport service unit, which FAB refers to as TAM Group 71, has been a part of FAB since 1945. TAM's inventory in the mid-1980s totaled 148 aircraft. Its commercial passenger flights to remote parts of Bolivia played a key role in unifying the country. TAM was commanded by the chief of TAM Group 71.

The other civil transport airline, TAB, was created as a decentralized company of FAB in 1977. Subordinate to the Air Transport

Management (Gerencia de Transportes Aéreos), TAB was headed by an FAB general. As a charter airline for transporting heavy cargoes, TAB linked Bolivia with most countries of the Western Hemisphere; its inventory included a fleet of Hercules C-130 aircraft. TAB's base of operations was headquartered in the FAB garrison of El Alto, adjacent to La Paz's international airport. TAB's most frequent route was to Miami and Houston, with stops in Panama.

Other civil air functions of FAB or DGAC included operating rescue and airport security units. In 1986 the DGAC was studying the reactivation of the Air Rescue Service (Servicio Aéreo de Rescate—SAR), which was apparently separate from FAB's GASR-51. The Airport Security (Seguridad de Aeropuertos) organization was created under FAB in 1987 to provide security at airport terminals. Under the new organization, personnel from FAB, the Administration of Airports and Aerial Navigation Auxiliary Services (Administración de Aeropuertos y Servicios Auxiliares de la Navegación Aérea—AASANA), and the Military Police provided security at each airport.

Civic Action

The three military services contributed significantly to the national welfare by performing various civic action functions throughout the country. These included constructing roads, airstrips, agricultural and industrial works, and schools; clearing land for colonization in eastern Bolivia; conducting literacy campaigns; and providing medical services to the civilian population living in the vicinity of bases. During his second term (1960-64), Paz Estenssoro gave the military an important role in social and economic development through the Civic Action Program, which the United States introduced in Bolivia. For example, the military began paving the Cochabamba-Santa Cruz highway, which opened up the fertile areas of eastern Bolivia to colonization. Although scanty financing limited the army's contribution to economic development, in the mid-1980s almost all of the army's engineer units were engaged in civil engineering works, such as the construction of roads and bridges.

FAB's two civil transport airlines—TAM and TAB—played a major role in civic action programs. TAM provided low-cost air services to the country's many remote areas, which were accessible only by air but could not be served regularly and economically on a commercial basis. TAB also provided air support during natural disasters, in coordination with the Bolivian Red Cross and Civil Defense, by delivering food supplies. In early 1989, Bolivia

purchased a Spanish CASA 212-M aircraft specifically for civil defense missions by the army and navy. The navy provided mobile medical clinics on the country's extensive navigable lake and river system and carried out comprehensive hydrological and hydrographic work and fisheries research, principally in the waters of Lake Titicaca. Because of the need for river bridges and maps, as well as flood-control studies, in 1964 the navy created the Naval Hydrography Service of Bolivia (Servicio de Hidrografía Naval de Bolivia). In March 1989, the Bolivian Shipping Company (Empresa Naviera Boliviana—Enabol) delivered a new vessel to the navy for use in health and other civic action projects in Bolivia's eastern lowlands.

Defense Budget

Data on the Bolivian defense budgets varied widely in the late 1980s. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the 1988 defense budget was US$87 million. According to the United States government's *The World Factbook, 1989,* however, the military budget in 1988 was US$158.6 million. These figures were considerably higher than press reports that the defense budget fell from US$130 million in 1985 to US$94 million in 1986 but rose to roughly US$100 million in 1988.

Despite a warning by the FF.AA. commander that a cut in the 1988 funds would endanger Bolivian security and sovereignty, the Paz Estenssoro government reportedly earmarked only about US$98 million for the 1988 military budget. After meeting with the FF.AA. commander in July 1988, however, Paz Estenssoro ordered the minister of finance to give priority to the armed forces budget. The minister of national defense subsequently reported that the problem of military budget cuts had been overcome, mainly as a result of US$5 million in aid provided by the United States, and that FF.AA. personnel had received salary increases.

Manpower and Training

Conscription

Since 1904 military service has been compulsory for all fit males between the ages of eighteen and forty-nine. In practice, however, budgetary limitations strictly limited the number of eligible men conscripted, and those traditionally tended to be mostly Indians. Beginning in 1967, conscripts were legally held on active duty for up to two years, but funds seldom permitted even a full year's service. Noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and warrant officers, all of whom were volunteers, generally were drawn from mixed-blood

cholos (see Mestizos and Cholos, ch. 2). In the late 1980s, the service obligation was one year, and conscripts had to be at least nineteen years of age. The FF.AA. commander reported in early 1989 that the largest percentage of conscripts came from the middle class. One explanation for this change could have been the flocking of youths to the lucrative coca paste-making business. Military authorities in the Cochabamba area in particular began to experience growing difficulty in enlisting volunteers in the mid-1980s. Consequently, the military reportedly was resorting to press-ganging eighteen-year-olds off the city streets to fill their annual quotas.

Ranks, Uniforms, and Insignia

The rank structure of the FF.AA. was conventional and conformed to the pattern of the United States services, although minor variations reflected disparities in force levels. The army had nine officer ranks, ranging from second lieutenant to three general officer ranks: *general de brigada* (brigadier general); *general de división* (division general), which was equivalent to a United States major general or lieutenant general; and *general de fuerza* (force general), whose United States counterpart was general. The rank *general de división* was usually reserved for the FF.AA. commander and the minister of national defense, if the latter was a military officer, as well as the army commander and president of the Supreme Tribunal of Military Justice (Tribunal Supremo de Justicia Militar).

Promotion from second lieutenant to first lieutenant, and from the latter to captain were made almost automatically after four years in each grade. Subsequent promotions were influenced greatly by completion of schooling, types of assignments, and performance ratings. Requirements included command of a unit, frontier service, and seniority. For promotion to major, lieutenant colonel, and colonel, five years in each grade were required. The Senate could veto a promotion to colonel or general. Army warrant officers and enlisted personnel ranged from private first class to sergeant major.

FAB's nine officer ranks went from *subteniente de aviación* (second lieutenant) to *general de fuerza aérea* (general). FAB's nine enlisted ranks began with the equivalent of airman basic and airman and ended with the equivalent of chief master sergeant.

The navy's ten officer ranks ranged from *alférez* (ensign) to *almirante* (admiral), equivalent to a United States vice admiral. Naval warrant officers and enlisted personnel had ten ranks, from the equivalent of seaman recruit to fleet force master chief petty officer.

Insignia of rank conformed to the designs adopted in 1968 by the Central American Defense Council (Consejo de Defensa

Centroamericano—Condeca). The commissioned officers' rank insignia for the three services were as follows: the army had silver stars on a blue background with a red border for the equivalent of second lieutenant through captain, silver stars on a red stripe with a blue background for major through colonel, and gold stars on a gold stripe with a red background for generals; FAB had gold stars for second lieutenant through colonel and gold stars on a gold background for general officers; and the navy had traditional gold stripes on the lower sleeve. Enlisted personnel of all three services wore the following: the army had silver bars or stripes; the navy had red or gold stripes or gold bars; and FAB had a blue bar or gold stripes (see fig. 13; fig. 14).

The military uniforms varied depending on climate and use—field, daily service, semidress, parade, ceremonial, and dress. Uniforms for army officers, NCOs, and enlisted personnel were generally gray or, for tropical areas, gray-green khaki. Naval uniforms for officers and NCOs were beige for cold climates, khaki for temperate areas, and white for lowland regions. Enlisted personnel wore the traditional blues and whites; their uniforms included a blue wool fatigue for cold climates and khaki or white uniforms for tropical areas, and black shoes. Officers and enlisted personnel in FAB wore blue squadron caps and blue uniforms for cold climates, and they wore khaki with blue garrison caps for tropical climates. Officers wore gray, green, or orange flight suits; enlisted personnel wore orange or green flight suits.

Military Schools

Bolivia's military schools, with one exception, operated under the direction of a colonel who occupied the position of director of military institutes on the army's Estado Mayor (Staff). Through the Estado Mayor's National Directorate of Instruction and Teaching (Dirección Nacional de Instrucción y Enseñanza), the director administered the school system from the army headquarters compound in La Paz's Miraflores district. The principal officer school complex was located in Cochabamba, however, under the jurisdiction of the Seventh Airborne Division commander.

Most officers of the three services attended a five-year basic training course at the "Colonel Gualberto Villarroel" Army Military Academy (Colegio Militar del Ejército "Coronel Gualberto Villarroel"—CME) in Irpavi, a valley suburb of La Paz. Officers identified with their Military Academy classes (*promociones*) throughout their military careers. To gain admittance, an applicant had to be Bolivian; single; a secondary school graduate (or pass a written examination with a high score); and under twenty years of age.

The applicant also had to produce a health document, certificates of good moral character from both the national police and the local police, and a recommendation from a "responsible sponsor." Every December the school graduated about ninety-five cadets, who were commissioned as second lieutenants or ensigns.

After a period of serving in units, Military Academy graduates proceeded to the specialist schools of their respective arms and services. Company-grade officers underwent a basic six-month course at the FF.AA.'s School of Arms in Cochabamba. After another year with a unit, they were required to attend a ten-month advanced course at this school. Army schools also included the Army Artillery School (Escuela de Artillería del Ejército—EAE) and the EC in Cochabamba. The EC's three-year course graduated hardy and disciplined troops for crisis situations. NCOs generally did not play any political role. Special Forces training for select members of all three services was given at the Army Condors School (Escuela de Cóndores del Ejército—ECE) in Sanandita, Tarija Department. Engineer officers in all three services, after three years of unit experience, enrolled in a five-year professional course at the EIM in La Paz.

For promotion to field grade or for staff appointments, an officer had to graduate from the appropriate two-year courses of the ECEM in Cochabamba. Since the school's inauguration in 1950, ECEM graduates who met certain other requirements were awarded the title of staff graduate (*diplomado de estado mayor*—DEM), were entitled to use DEM following their rank, and became eligible for certain key positions. The coveted title was required for command of tactical units or service on the Staff. Officers who had served at least two years as captains and received the top rating of "very good" from the School of Arms could apply to enroll in the two-year ECEM course.

After spending a period with a unit, an ECEM graduate could enroll in a nine- to twelve-month course at the National War College (EAEN), the only military school not under the director of military institutes. Distinguished civilians, such as lawyers and university professors, with an interest in national security affairs could also enroll. Military graduates of the EAEN course were awarded the prestigious title of graduate of high national studies (*diplomado de altos estudios nacionales*—DAEN), whose initials replaced the staff designation of DEM. Few officers were promoted to colonel without having completed the EAEN course, a prerequisite for promotion to general officer. (President Torres worsened his strained relations with the army by appointing, as army chief of staff, a young reformist officer who had not graduated from the EAEN



Figure 13. Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1989

course.) Every year Bolivia also sent officers on training scholarships (*becas*) abroad, usually to Argentina, Brazil, Peru, or the United States.

Air force officers completed the five-year course of the Military Academy in La Paz before being commissioned into FAB with a rank equivalent to second lieutenant. Officer pilots then transferred to the flying school in Santa Cruz for specialist training. Since 1955 FAB's aeronautical training institute had been the Colmilav in El Trompillo, Santa Cruz Department. Colmilav included primary and basic training squadrons. Graduates of Colmilav were promoted to second lieutenant. The Colmilav student body totaled about 300 cadets in 1988. Fewer than half of the 100 cadets who enrolled every year succeeded in graduating.

FAB's first aerotechnical training school was the Polytechnical Military School of Aeronautics (Politécnico Militar de Aeronáutica—PMA), established in 1953 and based in Cochabamba since January 1987. The PMA graduated aviation technicians with the rank of first-sergeant technicians (*sargentos primeros técnicos*). Its February 1986 graduating class totaled thirty-five members. In January 1986, the Technical Training School of the Air Force (Escuela de Capacitación Técnica de la Fuerza Aérea—ECT) was founded at El Alto Air Base outside La Paz. FAB officers received additional mid-career, postgraduate training at the ECEM in Cochabamba. The "General René Barrientos Ortuño" Air War School (Escuela de Guerra Aérea "General René Barrientos Ortuño"—EGA), which was inaugurated in 1973 for postgraduate studies, offered a command and staff course and, since February 1986, an air squadron course. A FAB group commander who used the title of graduate of aerial military studies (*diplomado de estudios militares aéreos*—DEMA) after his rank probably graduated from the EGA or EAEN. Many FAB officers also pursued additional courses of study abroad.

Bolivia had several naval schools. An Argentine naval mission assisted in the creation of two naval schools located in Tiquina: the Naval Military School (Escuela Naval Militar—ENM), established in 1973 and attended by officers attached to the CME in Irpavi; and the "Dr. Ladislao Cabrera Vargas" Naval Staff College (Escuela de Estado Mayor Naval "Dr. Ladislao Cabrera Vargas"—EEMN), sometimes referred to as the Naval War College, for commanding officers (*jefes*) and regular officers, which opened in 1970. Other naval schools included the Littoral Naval School (Escuela de Marinería Litoral—EML) in Trinidad, the Naval Technical School (Escuela Técnica Naval—ETN) for NCOs, and the Naval Application School (Escuela de Aplicación Naval—EAN) for

BOLIVIAN RANK	SOLDADO	DRAGONEANTE	CABO	SARGENTO SEGUNDO	SARGENTO PRIMERO	SUB-OFICIAL INICIAL	SUB-OFICIAL SEGUNDO	SUB-OFICIAL PRIMERO	SUB-OFICIAL MAYOR	SUB-OFICIAL MAESTRE
ARMY	NO INSIGNIA	NO INSIGNIA								INSIGNIA NOT KNOWN
U.S. RANK TITLES	BASIC PRIVATE	PRIVATE	PRIVATE 1ST CLASS	CORPORAL	SERGEANT	STAFF SERGEANT	SERGEANT 1ST CLASS	MASTER SERGEANT	SERGEANT MAJOR	COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR
BOLIVIAN RANK	SOLDADO	DRAGONEANTE	CABO	SARGENTO SEGUNDO	SARGENTO PRIMERO	SUB-OFICIAL INICIAL	SUB-OFICIAL SEGUNDO	SUB-OFICIAL PRIMERO	SUB-OFICIAL MAYOR	SUB-OFICIAL MAESTRE
AIR FORCE	NO INSIGNIA									
U.S. RANK TITLES	AIRMAN BASIC	AIRMAN	AIRMAN 1ST CLASS	SERGEANT	STAFF SERGEANT	TECHNICAL SERGEANT	MASTER SERGEANT	SENIOR MASTER SERGEANT	CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT	
BOLIVIAN RANK	MARINERO DE SEGUNDA	MARINERO DE PRIMERO	CABO	SARGENTO SEGUNDO	SARGENTO PRIMERO	SUB-OFICIAL INICIAL	SUB-OFICIAL SEGUNDO	SUB-OFICIAL PRIMERO	SUB-OFICIAL MAYOR	SUB-OFICIAL MAESTRE
NAVY										
U.S. RANK TITLES	SEAMAN RECRUIT	SEAMAN APPRENTICE	SEAMAN	PETTY OFFICER 3D CLASS	PETTY OFFICER 2D CLASS	PETTY OFFICER 1ST CLASS	CHIEF PETTY OFFICER	SENIOR CHIEF PETTY OFFICER	MASTER CHIEF PETTY OFFICER	FLEET FORCE MASTER CHIEF PETTY OFFICER

Figure 14. Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1989

subaltern officers. Naval personnel also continued to receive part of their training in Argentina.

Military Justice

As revised by the Banzer government, the 1978 Penal Code defined and established military jurisdiction over actions against the security of the state and against military personnel and property. It also established the military court system. The members of the FF.AA. are subject to certain military laws and regulations, which include the special Military Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Military Procedure. The Military Criminal Code establishes the death penalty for treason in its various forms, including disloyalty and espionage. FF.AA. members who commit criminal acts in the exercise of their specific functions are subject, depending on the nature of the offense, to military tribunals, which include disciplinary tribunals and courts of first instance, courts of appeal, and courts of nullity, without the intervention of the Supreme Tribunal of Military Justice.

Military justice matters are adjudicated by the Permanent Tribunal of Military Justice and, in the highest instance, by the Supreme Tribunal of Military Justice, both of which were headed by generals in the late 1980s. Some military cases may be adjudicated by civilian courts once the defendants have been expelled from the FF.AA. For example, a group of five army officers, headed by the commander of the Seventh Division in Cochabamba, was dishonorably discharged from the army in October 1988 after being caught protecting drug traffickers. Their case was turned over to civilian authorities three months later. In wartime, however, the military court has jurisdiction over the entire territory of the republic. Even in times of peace, territories declared to be military zones fall under military jurisdiction, although in practice the standards of military criminal justice generally have not been applied in trying civilians.

Foreign Military Assistance in the 1980s

The United States

United States military aid to Bolivia remained frozen for eight years until September 1985, shortly after Paz Estenssoro assumed office. In the second half of the 1980s, the United States continued its former role as Bolivia's principal foreign source of military assistance. The United States provided assistance through its Military Aid, Foreign Military Sales, and International Military Education and Training programs. In addition, Bolivian officers

received training at the School of the Americas (relocated from Panama to Fort Bragg, North Carolina) in fields such as radio and communications.

Bolivia and the United States also held two joint counterinsurgency exercises and one major antinarcotics operation in eastern Bolivia during the 1986–87 period of the Paz Estenssoro government (see Narcotics Trafficking, this ch.). Code-named United Forces—86, the exercises involved some 270 soldiers from Southcom and at least 1,000 Bolivian troops.

Three weeks of counterinsurgency exercises known as Absalom or United Forces 87—Bolivia were carried out in May 1987 with the participation of 350 United States troops and more than 1,000 Bolivian soldiers. According to the Bolivian minister of national defense, their objectives were to bring the staffs of the three armed forces branches up to date on the modern methods of conventional and unconventional warfare, to train the FF.AA. in conducting field exercises, and to carry out civic action. In testimony before the United States Congress, the United States deputy assistant secretary of defense for drug policy and enforcement explained that the joint counterinsurgency exercises emphasized command, control, communication, and intelligence procedures, as well as tactical air, riverine, special, military police, and light infantry operations.

In 1988 United States aid to the Bolivian military was being funneled through the Armed Forces National Development Corporation (Corporación de las Fuerzas Armadas para el Desarrollo Nacional—Cofadena), headquartered in La Paz. One of the military regimes created Cofadena as an industrial, agricultural, and mining holding company and development organization. Military companies under its purview included the National Factory of Explosives and Munitions (Fábrica Nacional de Explosivos y Municiones—Fanexa). The FF.AA. also established its own commercial bank, the Banco del Progreso Nacional (National Progress Bank).

In November 1988, Bolivia's minister of national defense announced that the United States, at the request of the Bolivian government, would grant the nation US$25 million to modernize the FF.AA. over a five-year period. United States financial assistance to the FF.AA. totaled US$5 million in 1988 and US$5.3 million in 1989. The military assistance agreement also included technical, training, and matériel aid. In January 1989, Bolivia's Congress authorized 300 United States military technicians, logistical personnel, and soldiers to spend four months expanding the runway of Potosí's Captain Rojas Airport to 3,000 meters by leveling a hill. Bolivia reportedly also agreed to receive three special United States military missions a year to train Bolivian troops. The

Plaza Avaroa, located in the Sopocachi suburb of La Paz
Courtesy United States Department of State

FF.AA. also acquired four Hercules C-130 aircraft in 1988, in addition to equipment donated by the United States Army during previous exercises.

Other Foreign Military Ties

In the 1980s, Bolivia also began seeking military aid from other countries, such as the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and China. A group of Bolivian military commanders visited West Germany in late 1985 to examine the role of a professional army in a democratic society. Taiwan ended its aid to the FF.AA. after Bolivia established relations with China in 1985. In the late 1980s, Bolivia expected to reach a series of agreements to receive Chinese military training, arms, and other military equipment.

The Security Forces

Historical Background

Although the marshal of Ayacucho, Antonio José de Sucre Alcalá, had organized the first Bolivian police force on June 24, 1826, the National Police (Policía Nacional) was not established officially until 1886. The Bolivian police became institutionalized on the national level in 1937 with the creation of the National Corps of Carabineers (Cuerpo Nacional de Carabineros) and its professional training

school, the Police School (Escuela de Policía), later renamed the National Police Academy (Academia Nacional de Policías). The carabineers constituted a post-Chaco War merger of the Military Police, the Gendarmerie Corps (Cuerpo de Gendarmería), the paramilitary Security Police (Policía de Seguridad), and the army's Carabineer Regiment (Regimiento de Carabineros).

Unlike in most Latin American countries, Bolivia's police forces had always been responsible to the national government rather than to lesser political authorities. The concept of centralized police power is established by the Constitution. The Police Law of 1886 formalized the system that remained in effect throughout the first half of the twentieth century. In 1950 the Organic Law of Police and Carabineers of Bolivia (Law No. 311) revised the police system substantially. Law No. 311 and the 1886 law provide the legal basis for the present-day police system.

Until the 1952 Revolution, the police corps was subordinate to the army and to the Ministry of National Defense. The army assumed most police functions and treated the corps as a reserve to be called on only in times of dire emergency. As a result of its active support of the 1952 Revolution, however, the national police received greater jurisdiction over police affairs and was modernized. It and the carabineers were transferred to the jurisdiction of what was then the Ministry of Interior, which concerned itself exclusively with administrative supervision. Nevertheless, the police resented being commanded by an army officer and having lower status and pay than the military.

Mission and Organization

The constitutional mission of the national police is to preserve public order, protect society through its specialized agencies, and guarantee enforcement of the laws. The police are also responsible for protecting foreign diplomatic missions. The police do not deliberate or participate in partisan politics. The Constitution stipulates that the president of the republic is the commander in chief of the police forces (see fig. 15). In this capacity, the president—acting through the minister of interior, migration, and justice—names the director general of the National Police Corps (Cuerpo de Policía Nacional), another name for the national police. In a national emergency, the president is empowered to administer directly the activities of the police corps. In time of international war, the police forces would be subordinate to the FF.AA. commander in chief and the Ministry of National Defense for the duration of the conflict. In that event, the Constitution requires that police activities be integrated with those of the army as though the

police were reserve units called to active duty for the duration of hostilities. The director general, who may be a civilian but almost invariably has been a high-ranking career police officer (usually with colonel rank), normally exercises operational control.

The police corps, with at least 15,000 personnel in the late 1980s, consisted of the General Administration (Administración General) section; the 5,000-member paramilitary National Guard (Guardia Nacional), still referred to as the carabineers (Carabineros), which were reorganized in 1976; the Directorate of National Investigations (Dirección de Investigaciones Nacionales—DIN), which cooperated with the International Police (Interpol); the Customs Police (Policía de Aduana); the Traffic Police (Policía de Tránsito); the National Highway Service (Servicio Nacional de Carreteras), which operated under the authority of the Ministry of Transport and Communications; the Fire Corps (Cuerpo de Bomberos), which was manned by police personnel; and the National Police Academy. All of these subordinate entities were separate administrative units within the director general's office. This office, which also served as national headquarters for all police and national guard activities, consisted of a command group, or Police General Command, which was established in the early 1980s, and a staff (Estado Mayor) made up of twelve numbered, conventionally established staff sections.

Special Police Forces

Other police forces under the Ministry of Interior, Migration, and Justice included antiriot, antinarcotics, and antiterrorist units. The Special Security Group (Grupo Especial de Seguridad—GES) was an operational, technical, and specialized unit. Its approximately 450 members were organized into motorcycle companies. They were mobilized to reestablish public order or to respond to an attack against private property. Normally, they served in the Legislative Palace; Ministry of Interior, Migration, and Justice; and other public institutions; or in the national police's National Guard and DIN.

The GES also assumed counterterrorist functions. In March 1987, French police advisers and Bolivian experts began giving a three-month antiterrorism course—consisting of technical and psychological training—to 400 GES members. The purpose of the training was to form a special group for responding to hostage-taking incidents. That June the Bolivian police announced officially the creation of a twenty-two-member antiterrorist command, the Multipurpose Intervention Brigade (Brigada de Intervención Polivalente—BIP), responsible for solving cases of "uncommon violence," such



Figure 15. Organization of the Police Forces, 1989

as kidnapping, hostage taking, and outbreaks of subversion. The government of President Paz Zamora gave responsibility for antiterrorist actions to the Special Elite Antiterrorist Force (Fuerza Especial Antiterrorista de Elite—FEAE).

The narcotics police, with about 6,000 members, included the Special Antinarcotics Force (Fuerza Especial de Lucha Contra el Narcotráfico—FELCN), created in 1987, and a subordinate force, the Rural Area Police Patrol Unit (Unidad Móvil Policial para Áreas Rurales—Umopar). The Umopar, popularly known as The Leopards (Los Leopardos), was formed in late 1983 under a United States-funded program designed to eradicate the nation's cocaine trade and in accordance with four treaties on narcotics, signed by both countries on August 11, 1983. By early 1989, the FELCN had its own intelligence service, which was charged with collecting evidence on individuals suspected of narcotics trafficking.

Regional Police Structure

The National Police Corps was a centralized force, organized on a territorial basis. Each department had a police district subdivided into zones. Field elements of the National Police and National Guard were stationed in all sectors of the country and reported directly to the office of the director general in La Paz. Each department generally had one brigade (*brigada*) of carabineers, consisting of an urban and a rural force. Subordinate headquarters (also known as brigades), stationed in the capital of each of the nine departments, coordinated and supervised operations. Each brigade was divided into an urban command and a rural command. The urban command, at the departmental capital, operated the police stations and local jails and was also divided into patrol and criminal investigation sections.

Most corps personnel and units within a department were considered—regardless of their size, composition, mission, or station—to be part of the brigade in the area they served and were members of a single departmental unit. An exception was the city of La Paz, where two separate regiments of carabineers were kept under the direct control of the director general and the president. Other exceptions to the integral brigade organization were made in sections of the country where dependence on the regular departmental brigade forces was not deemed advisable or feasible. Two such areas—San Ignacio de Velasco in Santa Cruz Department and Tupiza in Potosí Department—had independent carabineer detachments in addition to the department brigades.

Certain departmental brigade personnel of the rural command were assigned to a series of frontier posts scattered at twenty-seven

critical points along the borders and at river and lake ports of entry. They included Customs Police integral to the corps, as well as uniformed carabineers concerned with combating smuggling and other forms of illegal border crossing. The carabineers were also heavily involved in civic action in the more remote and less populated regions of the country. In an effort to improve its public relations, the police created the Department of Social Communication (Departamento de Comunicación Social) in the early 1980s.

Corps personnel were classified in three distinct groups: uniformed personnel (carabineers); technical and auxiliary personnel; and civilian police investigators and identification personnel. Ranks of uniformed personnel generally corresponded to those of the army. There were four general classifications—*jefes* (field officers), *oficiales* (company officers), *clases* (NCOs), and *tropas* (privates)—with a graded system of rank within each class. Uniformed personnel were promoted on the basis of annual examinations given when they attained the required time in grade, which was usually four years for all except captains and sergeants, who must spend five years in grade before becoming eligible for promotion. Classification of civilians was based on a nonmilitary two-category system composed of superiors (*funcionarios superiores*) and subalterns (*funcionarios subalternos*).

In the mid-1980s, approximately 80 percent of the National Police Corps were uniformed carabineers. The remaining 20 percent were civilian police investigators involved in crime detection, forensic science, administration, or logistics. Approximately half of the total uniformed personnel and 60 percent of the nonuniformed personnel of the police force were stationed in La Paz. The La Paz Departmental Police also had the Explosives Brigade (Brigada de Explosivos), which was subordinate to the Fire Corps. The 600-member Traffic Police administered traffic law. Only officers of this force normally carried sidearms. All motorcycle patrolmen were commissioned officers. The Feminine Police Brigade (Brigada Policial Femenina) served in an auxiliary or support capacity to the operational units. In addition to directing traffic, members of this brigade helped in police matters involving children and women.

All municipalities were entitled to raise local police forces to enforce local ordinances. Only La Paz, however, had established such a force, called the La Paz Municipal Police (Policía Municipal de La Paz). In the mid-1980s, this force numbered about 400 uniformed and 100 nonuniformed members, none of whom was armed. Their functions were limited to enforcing parking regulations and local bylaws. Most of the city of La Paz was under the jurisdiction of Police District No. 2, which consisted of five squadrons. Police

A police station in Villa Tunari, the Chapare
Courtesy Kevin Healy

District No. 3 was responsible for the sprawling shantytowns above the city known generally as El Alto. Police Regiment No. 4 exercised jurisdiction over the area south of La Paz.

Recruitment and Training

The police force was an unpopular career because of poor pay, conditions, and prestige and thus did not attract high-quality personnel. But officers and higher civilian employees, who generally were drawn from the small urban middle class, were of relatively higher quality. Many officer personnel came from the army. Officers were commissioned by graduation from the National Police Academy, by transfer from the army, by direct political appointment for demonstrated ability, or by outright patronage. Civilians were nearly always political appointees. Although specialized education was not a prerequisite for a civilian's appointment, some degree of qualification was usually present and facilitated on-the-job training. Enlisted personnel received most of their training on the job during the first four months after enlistment.

The academic year of the police education system began in February. The Young Men's Basic Police School (Escuela Básica Policial de Varones—EBPV), which had 120 students in 1983, provided a one-year training course at the operational level for subalterns of the national police.

The National Police Academy offered a four-year course for officers. In the early 1980s, the academy's curriculum included criminal law, penal and civil investigation, criminology, ballistics, laboratory science, narcotics, vehicular and pedestrian traffic, order and security of persons and installations, martial arts, and human and public relations. The academy also offered a specialized course patterned on the counterinsurgency course of the United States Army Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The police academy additionally offered a program of foreign training for officers. Selected personnel were sent to training courses either in the United States or in neighboring countries, particularly Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Peru. On completing their courses abroad, these trainees returned to Bolivia for duty, to lecture at the academy, or to organize and conduct unit-level courses throughout the corps.

In the past, admissions requirements for the academy gave greater importance to political reliability and unquestioned loyalty to the government than to education. By the early 1980s, applicants had to undergo medical, physical, and mental examinations, as well as tests of their general knowledge. Cadets accepted to attend the academy were not subject to the age limitations for enlisted military service. Matriculation exempted them automatically from their military obligations. The normal student body ranged from 480 to 500 cadets divided into four courses. In 1983 the academy had very few women cadets, and the incorporation of women into police ranks was at an experimental stage. On graduation, which required passing an examination, cadets received a bachelor of humanities certificate, a saber to symbolize officer rank, and a commission as second lieutenant in the carabineers. Those graduates who were drawn from brigades then returned to their units to organize local classes.

The Higher Police School (Escuela Superior de Policías—ESP) was created in February 1969 for officers in the ranks of lieutenant colonel and above. The ESP prepared higher officers to manage the command departments, operational units, and training institutes. In 1983 the ESP's student body consisted of fifty-seven higher officers.

Threats to Internal Security

Narcotics Trafficking

By the late 1980s, Bolivians had become increasingly aware of the serious threat to their society posed by drug traffickers. One Bolivian editorial identified several dimensions of that threat: the

existence of hundreds of clandestine airstrips in eastern Bolivia; flights of unidentified aircraft in Bolivian airspace; the presence of armed criminal groups; the disappearance of, and trafficking in, Bolivian passports; the intervention of officials of foreign governments in Bolivia's affairs; the acceptance of foreign troops on Bolivian territory; corruption within the national security agencies and courts of justice; the growing control of mass media by narcotics traffickers; the spread of drug abuse among Bolivian youth; and the increased links between traffickers and guerrilla groups.

Narcoterrorism

An unwanted by-product of Bolivia's cocaine industry was the importation of Colombian-style drug violence. In the late 1980s, Colombia's Medellín Cartel reportedly wielded considerable power in Bolivia, setting prices for coca paste and cocaine and terrorizing the drug underworld with hired assassins. Furthermore, drug barons, organized into families, had established their own fiefdoms in Cochabamba, Beni, and Santa Cruz departments, using bribes and assassinations to destroy local authority.

In September 1986, three members of a Bolivian scientific team were slain in the Huanchaca National Park in Santa Cruz Department shortly after their aircraft landed beside a clandestine coca-paste factory. The murders led to the discovery of the country's largest cocaine-processing installation, as well as evidence of an extensive international drug-trafficking organization consisting mostly of Colombians and Brazilians. President Paz Estenssoro fired the Bolivian police commander and deputy commander as a result of their alleged involvement. In a related action, suspected traffickers in Santa Cruz murdered an opposition deputy who was a member of the congressional commission that investigated the Huanchaca case.

In the late 1980s, there were several incidents of narcoterrorism against the United States presence, the judiciary, and antidrug agents. For example, the so-called Alejo Calatayu terrorist command claimed responsibility for a May 1987 bomb attack against the Cochabamba home of a United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent. The Supreme Court of Justice, seated in Sucre, requested and received military police protection in mid-1986. The Explosives Brigade successfully removed a live briefcase-bomb from the Senate library in August 1987. The so-called Santa Cruz Cartel, allegedly linked to the Medellín Cartel in Colombia, claimed responsibility for the machine-gun murders of two members of the FELCN in Santa Cruz in March 1988. Bolivians were also concerned about the increasing brazenness of Bolivia's drug traffickers,

as demonstrated in August 1988 by a low-power dynamite attack on Secretary of State George P. Shultz's car caravan as it headed down from La Paz's Kennedy International Airport. The so-called Simón Bolívar Group and the Pablo Zárate Willka National Indigenous Force (Fuerza Indigenista Pablo Zárate Willka—FIPZW) claimed responsibility.

Narcotics Corruption

Drug-related corruption reportedly began to take a firm hold within Bolivia's military and security services under General Banzer's rule (1971–78). The García Meza regime (1980–81), however, was one of Bolivia's most flagrant examples of narcotics corruption. García Meza's so-called cocaine coup was itself generally believed to have been financed by the cocaine "mafia," which bribed certain military officers. García Meza reportedly ruled with an "inner cabinet" of leading civilians and military officers involved in the cocaine trade. Two of his ministers—Colonel Ariel Coca and Colonel Luis Arce Gómez—were well-known "godfathers" of the industry. By 1982 approximately 4,500 prosecutions were under way in connection with the embezzlement of state funds by civil servants, said to amount to a total of US$100 million.

In early 1986, Congress charged García Meza and fifty-five of his former colleagues with sedition, armed uprising, treason, genocide, murder, torture, fraud against the state, drug trafficking, crimes against the Constitution, and other crimes. In April 1986, however, the Supreme Court of Justice suspended the first hearing in García Meza's murder trial, after his defense demanded the removal of three judges whom it charged had participated in García Meza's military government. The Supreme Court of Justice subsequently voted to remove its president and two other justices from the trial. After García Meza escaped from custody (he had been living under house arrest in Sucre) and reportedly fled the country in early 1989, the Supreme Court of Justice vowed to try him and two accomplices in absentia. Governmental and military/police corruption under the Paz Estenssoro government (1985–89) was less flagrant than in the 1980–82 period of military rule. Nevertheless, it reportedly remained widespread.

In December 1988, Bolivia's foreign minister asserted that narcotics traffickers were attempting to corrupt the political process. Bolivians were outraged, for example, by secretly taped "narcovideos" made in 1985 by Roberto Suárez Gómez (known as the "King of Cocaine" in Bolivia until the mid-1980s) and aired on national television in May 1988. The tapes, provided by a former naval captain cashiered for alleged corruption, showed two prominent politicians from Banzer's Nationalist Democratic Action

(Acción Democrática Nacionalista—ADN) and military figures fraternizing with Suárez.

The Umopar in particular had earned a reputation for corruption, especially in the Chapare region. In 1987, according to Department of State and congressional staff, drug traffickers were offering Umopar officers and town officials in the Chapare region amounts ranging from US$15,000 to US$25,000 for seventy-two hours of "protection" in order to allow aircraft to load and take off from clandestine airstrips. In February 1988, the deputy minister of national defense announced that about 90 percent of Umopar members, including twelve middle- and high-ranking officers, had been dismissed for alleged links to drug trafficking. The La Paz newspaper *Presencia* reported in March 1988 that Umopar chiefs, including the prosecutors, were working with narcotics traffickers by returning to them the large drug finds and turning only the small ones in to the authorities. Observers considered Umopar forces in Santa Cruz to be more honest and dedicated.

In October 1988, the undersecretary of the Social Defense Secretariat reiterated that drug traffickers had obtained the protection of important sectors of influence in Bolivia, including some military members and ordinary judges. He cited the example of Cochabamba's Seventh Division commander and four of his top officers, who were discharged dishonorably after they were found to be protecting a clandestine Chapare airstrip used by drug smugglers. The ministry official also announced that the navy was protecting drug-trafficking activities in the Puerto Villarroel area of the Chapare. For that reason, the United States suspended assistance to the navy temporarily in late 1988 until its commander was replaced. In December 1989, Bolivia's antidrug police captured no less a drug trafficker than Arce Gómez, who was subsequently extradited to the United States.

Bilateral and Legislative Antinarcotics Measures

In February 1987, Bolivia and the United States signed a broad outline of an agreement on a three-year, US$300 million joint plan aimed at eradicating 70 percent of Bolivia's known coca fields. The new program included a one-year voluntary eradication phase and a program in which coca growers would be paid US$350 in labor costs and US$1,650 in longer-term development assistance for each hectare of coca destroyed. According to the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, Bolivia exceeded the voluntary coca reduction target for the September 1987 to August 1988 period, destroying 2,000 hectares, or 200 more than required.

To implement the 1987 agreement, the Paz Estenssoro government revamped the antidrug bureaucracy that had been established, incongruously, in 1981 during the García Meza regime. The National Council Against the Unlawful Use and Illicit Trafficking of Drugs (Consejo Nacional Contra el Uso Indebido y Tráfico Ilícito de Drogas—Conalid), presided over by the foreign minister, was charged with drawing up rules and regulations and creating new antidrug-trafficking measures. Two new secretariats were formed under Conalid. The Social Defense Subsecretariat (Subsecretaría de Defensa Social) was made subordinate to the Ministry of Interior, Migration, and Justice and charged with interdiction. It also centralized all the activities of the National Directorate for the Control of Dangerous Substances (Dirección Nacional para el Control de Substancias Peligrosas—DNCSP) and of the Umopar. The Subsecretariat of Alternative Development and Substitution of Coca Cultivation (Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Alternativo y Sustitución de Cultivos de Coca) and its Coca Eradication Directorate (Dirección de la Reconversión de la Coca—Direco) were charged with drawing up overall rural development plans for the areas affected by the substitution of the coca plantations.

On July 19, 1988, to qualify for United States aid, Paz Estenssoro signed the Law of Regulations for Coca and Controlled Substances (Ley del Régimen de la Coca y Sustancias Controladas)—hereafter, the 1988 Antinarcotics Law. One of the strictest antinarcotics laws in Latin America, it aimed at eradicating illicit coca production and penalizing trafficking in drugs. As enacted by presidential decree in December 1988, the new law provided for a 10,000-hectare zone of legal coca cultivation in the Yungas region of La Paz Department and a small section of Cochabamba Department to meet traditional demand (down from a previous total of 80,000 hectares for the Yungas and Chapare regions) (see fig. 16). It also provided for a transitional zone of excess production in the Chapare region subject to annual reduction bench marks of 5,000 to 8,000 hectares and provided for an illegal zone, comprising all territory outside the traditional and transitional areas, in which coca cultivation was prohibited. The law prohibited the use of chemicals or herbicides for the eradication of coca, established that some 48,000 hectares of coca plantations would be eradicated over a five-year period, and set up a special judicial mechanism to deal with illegal drug trafficking.

Under the 1988 Antinarcotics Law, drug traffickers could be sentenced to prison for anywhere between five and twenty-five years; manufacturers of controlled substances, five to fifteen years; sowers and harvesters of illicit coca fields, two to four years; transporters,

eight to twelve years; and *pisadores* (coca stompers), one to two years. Minors under the age of sixteen who were found guilty of drug-related crimes would be sent to special centers until they were completely rehabilitated.

Shortly before the new law went into effect, a United States General Accounting Office report criticized Bolivia's methods of fighting drug trafficking. The study, whose undocumented generalizations about corruption reportedly irked Bolivian government officials, put the primary blame for the slow progress against drug trafficking on rampant corruption in Bolivia and "the unwillingness or inability of the government of Bolivia to introduce and implement effective coca control and enforcement measures." In rejecting the report, the minister of interior, migration, and justice noted in November 1988 that, in addition to arresting more than 1,000 individuals on drug charges, Bolivia had eradicated some 2,750 hectares of coca plantations, seized 22,500 kilograms of cocaine, and destroyed over 2,000 cocaine factories. Bolivian officials also asserted that more than 1,660 antidrug operations during 1988 had resulted in the destruction of from 1,000 to 1,400 clandestine cocaine factories and laboratories (80 percent of them in Cochabamba and Santa Cruz departments), the confiscation of about 10,000 kilograms of cocaine, and the arrest of some 700 individuals. The minister of planning and coordination stated in December that 2,900 hectares of coca crops had been eradicated under the financial compensation program.

Bolivia's antinarcotics units apprehended several prominent traffickers in 1988. At the same time that the 1988 Antinarcotics Law was promulgated, the Umopar arrested Suárez at his hacienda in Beni Department. According to one theory, Suárez allowed himself to be arrested in a bid to avoid extradition to the United States (see The Criminal Justice System, this ch.). In October 1988, the FELCN captured an alleged drug "godfather," Mario Araoz Morales ("El Chichín"), by chance during a training exercise in a jungle area. In November antidrug police in the Chapare also arrested Rosa Flores de Cabrera, alias Rosa Romero de Humérez ("La Chola Rosa"), described as one of the most-wanted women in the Bolivian drug-trafficking network, with connections to the Medellín Cartel.

Under the government of Jaime Paz Zamora (1989-), antidrug institutions were restructured, but Conalid remained the regulatory body. Conalid directed the Permanent Executive Coordination and Operations Council (Consejo Permanente de Coordinación Ejecutiva y Operativa—Copceo). Like Conalid, Copceo was headed

Source: Based on information from United States, Agency for International Development, *A Review of AID's Narcotics Control Development Assistance Program*, Washington, 1986, E-2.

Figure 16. Principal Coca-Growing Regions, 1985

by the foreign minister, and its membership also included the ministers of interior, migration, and justice; planning and coordination; social services and public health; agriculture, campesino affairs, and livestock affairs; education and culture; national defense; and finance. The new National Executive Directorate (Directorio Ejecutivo Nacional—DEN) was to support Copceo's plans and

program dealing with alternative development, drug prevention, and coca-crop eradication.

Antinarcotics Forces and Operations

Under the 1983 antidrug agreement, which established the Umopar, the United States provided an initial US$4 million to form, train, and equip (with nonlethal items) 300 Umopar members and a 30-member detective squad. In July 1984, the Siles Zuazo government undertook to dismantle the nation's billion-dollar drug industry and ensure the receipt of a United States economic aid package by declaring the nation's principal coca-growing area, the Chapare, a military zone. The government sent in up to 1,500 soldiers, including the Umopar, but withdrew the unpopular troops from the region by that September. Social scientist Kevin Healy observed that, with few exceptions, the Siles Zuazo government did not deploy police or military force to deal with the frequent peasant demonstrations against the drug war that took place throughout Bolivia during 1983–85.

The more conservative Paz Estenssoro government adopted a harder line. Following a meeting of the International Drug Enforcement Conference in April 1986, the Paz Estenssoro government requested United States military assistance in reaching isolated areas where drugs were being processed. In early July 1986, after extended negotiations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship authorized the entry of United States troops to provide requested temporary logistical support for National Police Corps find-and-destroy operations against coca-processing facilities in the Chapare region, as well as in Beni and Santa Cruz departments. The resulting United States support operation—called Operation Bol-USA in Bolivia and Operation Blast Furnace in the United States—got under way later that month with the arrival at Santa Cruz's Viru-Viru International Airport of a United States C-5A Galaxy transport airplane carrying 160 United States Rangers from Southcom and about 15 DEA members, along with six Black Hawk transport helicopters. The operation involved the United States Army officers—experts in communications and mechanics—in training 1,000 Bolivian soldiers from all three services in counterinsurgency tactics and special police in antinarcotics actions. The role of the United States personnel was limited to transporting police antinarcotics forces by helicopter to drug installations, all of which, however, were found to be deserted, owing to publicity about the operation.

The Bolivian government supported the operation despite negative public reaction. After about 20,000 demonstrators in La Paz

protested the continued presence of the United States troops in Bolivia in late August 1986, a majority in Congress approved the United States participation in the antinarcotics operation. To receive greater logistical support for antinarcotics efforts, the Bolivian government extended the presence of the United States troops in the country for a second sixty-day period. The United States effectively ended the operation in mid-November 1986 by withdrawing its soldiers. Once they had departed, however, the coca trade flourished anew.

The Paz Estenssoro government attempted to involve the FF.AA. in the antinarcotics struggle. In late 1986, it established a unit called the Operational Tasks Command (Comando de Tareas Operativas—CTO) to coordinate police and military efforts. The government then formed the FELCN, which by 1988 consisted of 640 Umopar members. Its creation also was intended to reduce the participation in antinarcotics matters of high-ranking police officers and to downgrade the Umopar. The FELCN was envisaged as drawing recruits from the FF.AA., police, and other organizations, such as the GES. The Paz Estenssoro government agreed to pay for the maintenance of the new force's specialized troops, and the United States agreed to outfit it with US$123 million worth of helicopters, weapons, motorboats, and other equipment. Paz Estenssoro appointed a former FAB commander to head the FELCN general command and made the Umopar a subordinate unit.

In 1987 the navy leased eight Piranha patrol boats from the DEA for riverine interdiction in Cochabamba and Beni departments. The Piranhas were to be staffed jointly by naval and antidrug police personnel, with assistance from DEA agents.

FAB's involvement increased in September 1987 when it created the Task Force (Fuerza de Tarea) to provide air support for national antinarcotics efforts. The new unit's inventory included six Huey UH-1H helicopters leased from the United States after Operation Blast Furnace. The United States also provided a thirty-day training course taught by a team of twenty-eight United States military pilots and technical personnel. After forming its Task Force, FAB armed the unit's six Huey helicopters with machine guns in order to provide for the defense of law enforcement officials when they inspected drug crops. In 1987 three of the unit's Huey helicopters were deployed in Trinidad and at the forward base of San Javier, and the three others were in the Chapare.

A United States congressional report issued in 1987 alleged that corruption and indifference among the Task Force's FAB pilots made their participation counterproductive. In any event, in its first year the Task Force completed 1,200 missions totaling 3,200

Antidrug agents unloading seized cocaine in Cochabamba Department
Seizure of a cocaine laboratory in the Cochabamba Valley

hours without incident (although three members were killed in February 1989 when their Cessna 206 crashed). In April 1989, the undersecretary of the Social Defense Secretariat reported that Task Force patrols in the Chapare had "completely paralyzed" the flights of small aircraft believed to be involved in drug trafficking. The Task Force was scheduled to receive an additional six Hueys in 1989.

In 1987 a United States Army Special Forces training team began a series of five-week training courses for Umopar personnel in topics such as operations and small-unit tactics, map reading, jungle survival, and communications. The Chapare base camp in Chimoré, a town on the road linking Cochabamba with Yapacani, served as the venue for conducting a basic course; the Umopar camp in Trinidad, capital of Beni Department, provided an advanced tactics course. According to the Department of State, six such courses were provided in 1987, and an additional six were planned for 1988. By mid-1988, 340 troopers, including 7 women, had graduated from the basic course and 200 from the advanced course.

In the spring of 1988, the DEA and local authorities began a new round of antinarcotics programs called Operation Snowcap. DEA agents in teams of fifteen to twenty-five began serving in the Chapare on a rotating basis. The operation also involved members of the United States Army Special Forces, who were confined to military camps where they trained Bolivian troops. In addition, in simultaneous attempts to interdict laboratory chemicals being smuggled into the Chapare, United States Border Patrol agents aided Bolivian police at road checkpoints, while patrol boats plied rivers in the region. By April 1988, as a result of antidrug operations mainly in the Chapare, where some 90 percent of the 300,000 farmers in the region were involved in growing coca or processing and marketing coca paste, coca prices plummeted temporarily and dozens of coca fields went unharvested.

Attitudes Toward Antinarcotics Forces

The presence of the United States military forces in Bolivia in 1986 created widespread controversy in the country. Although four political parties, including the ruling party and, belatedly, Congress approved the joint Bolivian-United States military exercises in the Chapare lowlands of Cochabamba Department from April 26 to May 6, 1986, several leftist parties and civilian trade union and regional organizations opposed them as a violation of national sovereignty. Political and labor opposition groups, including the Bolivian Labor Federation (Central Obrera Boliviana—COB), formed a council to express their strong opposition to the presence

of the United States forces and to challenge the legality of inviting foreign troops into the country without the prior approval of Congress. The most militant opposition came from workers, campesinos, and other residents of the Chapare and Yungas regions who claimed that coca growing was their only means of making a living. Urged on by cocaine traffickers and peasant union federations, coca farmers resorted to mass-mobilization tactics such as sit-ins, demonstrations, and road blockades. In one incident in October 1986, some 6,000 residents of the Beni town of Santa Ana de Yacuma expelled 150 United States soldiers and Umopar members.

In the late 1980s, the Bolivian press charged that DEA agents had killed a number of demonstrating peasants, protected the Huanchaca cocaine factory, and failed to combat the coca/cocaine industry. In July 1987, campesinos laid siege to a DEA camp in Chimoré, forcing the temporary departure of twenty-five DEA agents and the relocation of the Umopar base. In May 1988, thousands of campesinos demonstrated for two days in downtown Cochabamba, demanding the expulsion of twenty DEA agents from Bolivia and governmental respect for their coca-growing livelihood. In order to get the coca growers to return home, the government agreed to modify the eradication plan. In addition to promising not to force any relocations, the government pledged to seek only voluntary reduction of coca fields, to decriminalize coca growing, and to seek more funds to develop other crops.

Exercises called United Forces 88 scheduled for May 1988 were suspended, in part because of widespread complaints in the local press, Congress, and among political parties about the holding of the May 1987 Absalom exercises. Most of Bolivia's political parties denounced them as another violation of national sovereignty. The president dismissed his minister of national defense after the latter, inebriated, failed to provide a coherent explanation to Congress of why the government invited the United States troops to participate in the scheduled 1988 exercises.

In the Chapare, where more than a dozen campesinos were reported killed by the Umopar in the 1986–88 period, charges of human rights abuses by antidrug forces helped drug traffickers to incite Chapare coca growers. The president of the Permanent Assembly of Human Rights of Bolivia (Asamblea Permanente de Derechos Humanos de Bolivia) reported in 1988 that antidrug police routinely attacked coca growers, robbing them of money and goods. At the same time, the drug traffickers, better armed than the Umopar, methodically employed terrorist methods against Chapare residents who refused to cooperate with the cocaine industry.

The 1988 Antinarcotics Law inflamed Bolivia's long tradition of nationalist, anti-imperialist, and anti-Yankee sentiment. Bolivians widely perceived the new law to be the result of unacceptable pressure on their government by the United States, which had linked coca eradication to the disbursement of loans to Bolivia by the United States, the World Bank (see Glossary), and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The left-wing opposition, including the Free Bolivia Movement (Movimiento Bolivia Libre—MBL), joined forces with coca producers in opposing the law.

Despite the adoption of the 1988 Antinarcotics Law and the government's claims of progress in the antidrug struggle, Bolivian officials and political leaders in early 1989 reportedly felt that enforcing antidrug measures through repression caused too much social and economic damage. In addition, repressive measures were met with violent resistance by coca growers and processors. In an apparent policy shift, Paz Estenssoro began advocating voluntary crop substitution and eradication. His government also began to seek US$600 million from wealthy nations to develop alternative agricultural crops and jobs, build roads, and install electricity in the Chapare. The Paz Estenssoro government also remained publicly opposed to the possible return of United States troops to Bolivia.

Subversive Groups

As of 1989, Bolivia had not been confronted with a significant subversive threat since the Cuban-supported guerrilla campaign led by "Che" Guevara in 1966–67 (see The Counterinsurgency Decade, this ch.). Other guerrilla bands, such as those operating in the area near Teoponte in the Yungas in 1969–70, were even shorter lived. A small group tried to set up a guerrilla unit in the Luribay Valley south of La Paz in 1983, but seven of its members were captured.

Several international terrorist meetings were reported to have been held in Bolivia in the 1980s, including three in 1985 and 1986 that were attended by terrorist representatives from other South American countries. Two meetings between Bolivian left-wing extremists and representatives of other South American terrorist organizations allegedly were held in Cobija, Pando Department, and in La Paz in 1985. According to the deputy minister of interior, migration, and justice, representatives of terrorist organizations from eight countries held another meeting in Santa Cruz in February 1986.

In early 1987, Peru's Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) began to concern Bolivian civilian and military authorities after they

learned that its strategic plan called for expanding terrorist actions into Bolivia and Ecuador. Various press reports in 1987 and 1988 suggested that Sendero Luminoso guerrillas were using Bolivian territory, especially La Paz, to obtain medical assistance, medicine, food, weapons, and other supplies to support their revolutionary activities in Peru.

A total of six international terrorist incidents took place in Bolivia in 1988, compared with three in 1987. A previously unknown group called the Revolutionary Labor Movement (Movimiento Obrero Revolucionario—MOR) claimed responsibility for assassinating the Peruvian military attaché in La Paz in December 1988, an act that the Bolivian police commander attributed to Sendero Luminoso. A number of politically oriented terrorist incidents took place in the months leading up to the May 1989 elections. A terrorist group called the Zárate Willka Armed Forces of Liberation (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Zárate Willka—FALZW), presumably another name for the FIPZW, took responsibility for a bombing in December 1988 that caused much damage to the offices of the president of the Chamber of Deputies and for machine gunning to death two young Mormon missionaries from Utah in a La Paz barrio in May 1989. Pre-election terrorism by unknown perpetrators in March 1989 included bombings at various political party offices in the La Paz area that caused considerable property damage and a bomb attempt at the United States embassy.

Crime and Punishment

The Criminal Justice System

General Procedures

The administration of justice in criminal matters was exercised by the ordinary courts and judges in accordance with the 1978 Law on Judicial Organization. The courts and the criminal procedures are rooted in the old Spanish and Napoleonic codes and are unified in a single national system under the Ministry of Interior, Migration, and Justice. There are no jury trials, and the presiding judges base all decisions on their own evaluation of the data brought out during the proceedings. The Public Ministry, under the Ministry of Interior, Migration, and Justice, is intimately involved in court procedures involving public or civil cases in which the Penal Code has been violated. It is headed at the national level by two attorneys general (*fiscales generales*) who operate in the fields of criminal and civil law. Subordinate prosecutors (*fiscales* and *subfiscales*) are stationed throughout the country, where they serve in capacities similar to, but more wide-ranging than, those of state and district attorneys in the United States.

The police are responsible for apprehending and arresting criminals, although a citizen may arrest an offender if caught in the act of committing a crime. The Judicial Police (Policía Judicial) is responsible for ascertaining and verifying crimes, collecting evidence, and delivering the suspects to the judges and tribunals for trial. The Traffic Police exercises functions of the Judicial Police in cases involving traffic accidents; authorities responsible for air, river, lake, and rail transport assume the same responsibility for cases involving their respective means of transport.

The Constitution requires that police have a court order to make an arrest. An individual detained by the police in a local jail must be charged or released within twenty-four hours, except during a state of siege, when authorities may detain persons for up to forty-eight hours before obtaining an arrest order. During the initial period, a judge must determine the legality of the detention. Prisoners are usually released if they are determined to have been detained illegally. After charging a detainee, the police notify the public prosecutor, who lodges a complaint before an investigating judge, who then assumes the case. An arrested suspect is presumed innocent until proven guilty and may consult a lawyer of his choice if charged with a crime. An individual charged with a crime may qualify to be released on bail, which is generally granted except in certain narcotics cases.

In situations involving penal action, the office of the Public Ministry is responsible for assembling the evidence and testimony and, with police assistance, studying the complaint, visiting the scene of the crime, and locating and interrogating witnesses. When the evidence, including depositions, is assembled, the investigating judge holds an open hearing before all interested parties. The public prosecutor makes an accusation and presents all witnesses and documents for the prosecution. Witnesses deliver their testimony as a continuous narrative, without being questioned directly or cross-examined. When the prosecution has finished, the judge interrogates the accused and receives depositions and statements from witnesses who may appear on behalf of the accused. Defendants have the right to an attorney, including a court-appointed defense attorney at public expense, if necessary, but a lawyer is not always provided because of a lack of funds and qualified attorneys. Defendants also have the right to confront witnesses, to present evidence, and to appeal a judicial decision. These rights generally are upheld in practice. Although the constitutional right of fair public trial is adhered to, long delays in the judicial system are common, according to the United States Department of State. Investigations, trials, and appeals procedures are so lengthy that some prisoners eventually

serve more time than the maximum sentence for the crime for which they were charged. A United Nations (UN) agency agreed in early 1989 to provide assistance to improve the administration of justice in Bolivia.

The trial judge reviews the investigating judge's summary and makes one of several possible determinations, in consultation with the public prosecutor. The trial judge may decide that the indictment is unwarranted and dismiss the case, or the trial judge may remand the case to the investigating judge for trial and deposition, depending on the seriousness of the crime. The trial judge also acts as a court of second instance for actions taken by an investigating judge. If the trial judge concurs in the decision by a lower court, the action is ended; a judge who disagrees may direct a retrial. The judge also considers appeals from decisions of the lower courts. If the trial judge decides to hear a new case, the proceedings are generally similar to those in the lower court, but there are some important differences. For example, the defendant must be represented by an attorney, either his own or one appointed by the judge. Additional witnesses may be called—either for or against the defendant—if the judge feels that they may contribute to a better understanding of the case. The judge may also call on advisers when ready to study the data developed during the trial. Within three days after the trial's conclusion, the judge must confront the defendant and pronounce sentence. The district courts and the Supreme Court of Justice follow the same procedures for reviews and appeals.

Extradition

Under Article 3 of the Penal Code, no person who is subject to the jurisdiction of Bolivian laws may be extradited to another nation except by an international treaty or reciprocal agreement. Article 44 of the Constitution empowers the executive to deliver to a foreign government, under a reciprocal agreement, any individual accused or indicted by the judges or tribunals of the foreign country, as long as it involves a crime committed in its territory and the extradition conforms to international treaties. Presented with an extradition request, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship will pass it to the Supreme Court of Justice to establish the procedure for the extradition. Although a 1901 Bolivia-United States treaty provides for extradition, it does not specifically mention narcotics offenses. Nevertheless, both countries are signatories to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, which provides that narcotics offenses are to be considered covered by all extradition agreements between signatory nations.

Impact of Narcotics Trafficking

In the late 1980s, there continued to be concern about an overburdened and allegedly corrupt judicial system. According to the Department of State's *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1988* and Bolivian press reports, judges were implicated in drug-related corruption. Narcotics traffickers routinely tried to bribe judicial and other officials in exchange for releasing suspected smugglers, returning captured drugs, and purging incriminating files. In 1988 the Senate's Constitution and Justice Committee ordered the suspension of thirteen judges of the La Paz, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz superior district courts of justice for wrongdoing in drug-trafficking cases. The Supreme Court of Justice insisted, however, on its prerogative to try the judges first. After doing so, it ordered the suspension of several of the accused judges and continued to investigate others.

Relatively few prosecutions or forfeitures of traffickers' assets took place. A lack of judicial investigatory power hampered the investigation of the bank accounts and the origin of wealth of people suspected of trafficking in drugs. Although thirteen of the "big bosses" reportedly had been identified by early 1988, arrests of drug kingpins were infrequently reported because of lack of evidence.

In ruling on the 1986 Huanchaca case involving the slaying of a leading Bolivian scientist, his pilot, and a guide, the Third Criminal Court of Santa Cruz returned a guilty verdict in April 1988 against ten Brazilians and a Colombian, in addition to a Bolivian thought to be dead. The court, however, dismissed charges against five other Bolivian suspects, including several well-known drug traffickers. The freeing of two of the suspects by the Santa Cruz judges prompted the Supreme Court of Justice to demand the resignations of the entire Santa Cruz judiciary because of its leniency toward drug traffickers. Four Santa Cruz judges were dismissed because of irregularities in the Huanchaca case, which in early 1989 remained at an impasse, under advisement in the Supreme Court of Justice.

Under the 1988 Antinarcotics Law, the Judicial Police must report antinarcotics operations to the closest FELCN district within forty-eight hours. The law also called for the creation of three-judge Special Narcotics-Control Courts or tribunals (Juzgados Especiales de Narcotráfico) with broad responsibilities. In early 1989, the Supreme Court of Justice began appointing judges and lawyers to serve on the new tribunals, two of which began functioning as tribunals of first instance in narcotics-related cases, with jurisdiction

for the judicial districts of La Paz, Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, and Beni. A total of thirteen Special Narcotics-Control Courts were supposed to be operating by mid-1989, with two in each of the districts of La Paz, Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, and Beni and only one responsible for the five remaining departments. Their judges, adjunct prosecutors, and support staff were to receive higher salaries than other judicial officials. However, the Paz Zamora government reportedly planned to disband these courts.

The Penal System

In arriving at a verdict, the judge considers the nature of the crime committed and the existence of special circumstances surrounding the case before imposing a penalty or punishment. The judge must give special attention to the criminal's intent. Bolivia's Penal Code distinguishes clearly between felonies and misdemeanors. The former is committed voluntarily and in a spirit of malice; the latter, without malice. The Penal Code recognizes the following three types, or orders, of punishment that may be imposed on criminals, regardless of whether or not the offense was a felony or misdemeanor: corporal punishments that involve some form of restraint or restriction on the person of the offender, such as imprisonment; noncorporal punishments that call for nonphysical penalties, such as deprivation of a civil right, surveillance, bonding, or reprimand; and pecuniary punishments that exact a fine or other form of monetary payment.

Although the 1967 Constitution abolishes capital punishment, it was restored in October 1971 for terrorism, kidnapping, and crimes against government and security personnel. In 1973 the Supreme Court of Justice upheld the constitutionality of Article 109, one of several state security provisions of the Penal Code that entered into force in 1973, which mandates the death penalty, by firing squad, for any Bolivian who takes up arms against the nation, joins its enemies, or collaborates with the enemy in the event of a foreign war. In 1981 the death penalty was extended to drug trafficking. A death sentence could not be carried out, however, until the president decided against commutation. The president could commute the death penalty in favor of the second most severe punishment, which was thirty years at hard labor, with no recourse to pardon or clemency.

Thirty years at hard labor was also mandated under Article 111 (espionage) and Article 118 (sabotage). Under Article 133, terrorist actions carried a penalty of two to ten years in prison or, in the event of the death or severe wounding of the victim, twenty to thirty

years. Engaging in armed actions against the security and sovereignty of the state was punishable under Article 121 by a penalty of fifteen to thirty years in prison. Article 128 provided that any attempt against the life or security of the president or other high government officials would be punishable by five to ten years of prison. Article 17 established that the penalties for drug-related offenses would never exceed thirty years' imprisonment. Most other crimes did not carry a greater penalty than ten years' imprisonment. At the request of a condemned individual, a judge could also choose to suspend a sentence or grant a parole or conditional liberty.

Bolivia's Penal Code also included a statute of limitations. A severe criminal offense could not be prosecuted unless the offender was brought to justice within ten years of the date of its commission. Judicial pardon did not exist in the Bolivian penal system, but both the president and Congress had this power in certain limited circumstances. Both were authorized to declare amnesty for political offenses, and Congress was empowered to pardon offenders in either criminal or civil cases, provided that the Supreme Court of Justice concurred.

Bolivia had several penal institutions, including the San Pedro national penitentiary (known as Panóptico) in La Paz and one in each of the nine departments. Most departments had jails to accommodate local offenders whose crimes were serious enough to warrant long-term imprisonment. Other facilities included a correctional farm at Caranavi in the Yungas, a reformatory for women at La Paz, and three reformatories for juveniles, one at La Paz and two near Cochabamba. These institutions, with the exception of the juvenile reformatories, were under the general supervision of the Ministry of Interior, Migration, and Justice, which assigned detachments of carabineers to provide guard and security forces.

Conditions at the Caranavi correctional farm, where prisoners engaged in common work in the fields during the day, were better than in most penal institutions in Bolivia. Regulations there were strict, and prisoners were tightly secluded in their cells at night under enforced silence. Communication with the outside world was regulated closely, and families were rarely permitted to visit inmates. Nevertheless, by being close to the source of food supply, the Caranavi prisoners had better meals than did inmates in urban prisons. The Women's Reformatory at La Paz, with a capacity for only thirty women, had the best conditions of all institutions in the system. It was operated under contract by a Roman Catholic order of nuns.

The treacherous road to Caranavi, Nor Yungas Province, La Paz Department
Courtesy Inter-American Foundation (Kevin Healy)

According to the Department of State, in 1989 there continued to be occasional reports of abuse of prisoners and detainees by individual police and security officers, although the Constitution prohibits torture and the Siles Zuazo, Paz Estenssoro, and Paz Zamora governments neither condoned nor practiced such activity. According to evidence made public in late 1989, forty or more severely mistreated prisoners were reported to have died and been secretly buried in a clandestine cemetery at the Espejos Rehabilitation Farm in Santa Cruz Department. Police, prison, and security personnel were rarely tried and punished for cruelty toward or degrading treatment of detainees. Corruption, malnutrition, and unsanitary conditions were endemic in Bolivia's underfinanced prison system. Although reportedly built at a cost of US$600,000, Santa Cruz Department's new Public Prison (Cárcel Pública) for juvenile delinquents, renamed the Santa Cruz Young Men's Rehabilitation Center (Centro de Rehabilitación de Varones Santa Cruz), was the site of inmate sabotage in early 1989.

Incidence of Crime

In the late 1980s, data on the incidence of crime in Bolivia either were not publicly available or were fragmentary. Until drug trafficking became pervasive in the 1980s, crime had not been exceptionally

high and indeed was minimal. Petty thievery ranked high on the list of most common crimes. Also reported with considerable frequency were personal assaults, disorderly conduct, rape, and child neglect. Young men seemed to be involved in thievery more than in other forms of crime, whereas older men were more frequently arrested for acts of violence against other persons. The incidence of crime tended to be highest during holidays and festivals, when excessive drinking is common.

Although crime statistics were unavailable, newspaper editorials and reports indicated growing concern with a surge of violence and crime in the 1980s that included kidnapping, rapes of children, unsolved murders, and assaults with sophisticated lethal weapons against vehicles traveling on public roads. In November 1988, a high-ranking police official discussed police concern about the high crime rate in La Paz, especially those crimes in which undocumented minors and foreigners were involved. A wave of kidnappings was affecting Santa Cruz in the late 1980s. Victims included an agro-industrial businessman—a nephew of the Bolivian vice president—kidnapped in October 1987 and released a week later in exchange for a ransom payment of US$10,000; the son of the Bolivian State Petroleum Enterprise (Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos—YPFB) president, held for a ransom of US$160,000; and an industrialist, released after payment of a US$100,000 ransom. There were no reports of political killings or politically motivated disappearances in Bolivia in 1988.

* * *

In mid-1989 the scholarly literature on Bolivia's armed forces and other aspects of the country's national security remained limited. *Revolution and Reaction,* the well-researched book by James M. Malloy and Eduardo A. Gamarra, gives in-depth analysis of military authoritarianism during the 1964–82 period. General surveys of Bolivia that provide some historical or political analysis of the military and security forces include Robert J. Alexander's *Bolivia: Past, Present, and Future of Its Politics,* James Dunkerley's *Rebellion in the Veins,* Herbert S. Klein's *Bolivia: The Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic Society,* and Malloy's *Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution.* English-language studies focusing more on military institutions include Charles D. Corbett's *The Latin American Military as a Sociopolitical Force* and Adrian J. English's *Armed Forces of Latin America.* Relevant books by Bolivian authors include Guillermo Bedregal Gutiérrez's *Los militares en Bolivia,* Guillermo Lora's *Causas de la inestabilidad política y de la crisis de las FF.AA.,* José Vargas Valenzuela's *Tradición*

naval del pueblo de Bolivia, and former General Gary Prado Salmón's *Poder y fuerzas armadas, 1949–1982.* Useful historical background is also found in Maria Luise Wagner's dissertation, "Reformism in the Bolivian Military." Another dissertation on the military is James Dunkerley's "The Politics of the Bolivian Army."

Kevin Healy's "Coca, the State, and the Peasantry in Bolivia, 1982–1988" and "The Boom Within the Crisis" provide well-informed analyses of Bolivia's cocaine industry, particularly its rural impact. Useful information on narcotics issues is also contained in the United States General Accounting Office's *Drug Control* and the United States Congress's *On-Site Staff Examination of Narcotics Control Efforts in Bolivia.* An informative Bolivian account of Bolivia's struggle against narcotics trafficking is *La Lucha boliviana contra la agresión del narcotráfico* by Guillermo Bedregal Gutiérrez and Rudy Viscarra Pando. Some of the more revealing books published in Bolivia on narcotics issues include *La veta blanca* by René Bascopé Aspiazu; *Bolivia: Coca, cocaína, subdesarrollo y poder político* by Amado Canelas Orellana and Juan Carlos Canelas Zannier; and *Narcotráfico y política,* produced by the Instituto de Estudios Políticos para América Latina y Africa.

Information on the Bolivian criminal justice and penal systems can be found in Fernando B. Aguirre's "The Legal System of Bolivia" in Kenneth Robert Redden's *Modern Legal Systems Cyclopedia;* Bolivia's *Código penal;* the Constitution of Bolivia in Gilbert H. Flanz, et al., *Constitutions of the Countries of the World;* and *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,* a report submitted annually to the United States Congress by the Department of State. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

Appendix

Table

Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors

When you know	Multiply by	To find
Millimeters	0.04	inches
Centimeters	0.39	inches
Meters	3.3	feet
Kilometers	0.62	miles
Hectares (10,000 m^2)	2.47	acres
Square kilometers	0.39	square miles
Cubic meters	35.3	cubic feet
Liters	0.26	gallons
Kilograms	2.2	pounds
Metric tons	0.98	long tons
	1.1	short tons
	2,204	pounds
Degrees Celsius (Centigrade)	9 divide by 5 and add 32	degrees Fahrenheit

Table 2. Population and Growth Rate by Region, 1980–85

Region	Population [1]						Growth Rate [2]					
	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Altiplano	2,957	3,037	3,122	3,204	3,292	3,382	n.a.	2.7	2.8	2.6	2.7	2.7
Yungas and other valleys	1,519	1,556	1,591	1,632	1,631	1,712	n.a.	2.4	2.3	2.6	2.4	2.4
Lowlands	1,123	1,163	1,203	1,246	1,289	1,335	n.a.	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5
TOTAL [3]	5,600	5,755	5,916	6,082	6,213	6,429	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

n.a.—not available.

[1] In thousands.

[2] In percentages.

[3] Figures may not add to total because of rounding.

Source: Based on information from Bolivia, Ministerio de Planeamiento y Coordinación, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, *Bolivia en cifras, 1985,* La Paz, 1986, 38–40.

Table 3. Projected Rural and Urban Growth Rate, Selected Years, 1990–2025

	Population [1]				Growth Rate [2]				Percentage of Total Population			
	1990	1995	2000	2025	1990	1995	2000	2025	1990	1995	2000	2025
Rural	3,636	3,986	4,336	7,044	1.6	1.9	1.7	1.1	49	n.a.	44	40
Urban	3,763	4,571	5,502	10,565	4.2	4.0	3.8	2.3	51	n.a.	56	60
TOTAL [3]	7,400	8,557	9,839	17,609	2.9	2.9	2.9	3.5	100	100	100	100

n.a.—not available.

[1] In thousands.

[2] In percentages.

[3] Figures may not add to total because of rounding.

Source: Based on information from Bolivia, Instituto Geográfico Militar, *Atlas de Bolivia,* Barcelona, 1985, 196; and Carlos F. Toranzo (ed.), *Bolivia hacia el 2000,* Caracas, 1989, 180.

Table 4. Estimated Enrollment of School-Aged Population by Education Level and Sex, 1965, 1973, and 1987
(in percentages)

Level	1965	1973	1987
Primary school			
Male	86	91	94
Female	60	62	81
Both sexes	73	76	87
Secondary school			
Male	21	28	38
Female	15	20	32
Both sexes	18	24	35

Source: Based on information from World Bank, *Social Indicators of Development, 1987*, Washington, 1987.

Table 5. Probability of Dying Before Age Five by Region, Rural-Urban Breakdown, and Department, 1976

	Before Age One	Before Age Two	Before Age Five
Region			
Altiplano	.16	.22	.27
Yungas and other valleys	.17	.23	.28
Lowlands	.11	.15	.17
Area			
Urban	.12	.17	.19
Rural	.17	.24	.29
Department			
Beni	.11	.14	.17
Chuquisaca	.18	.26	.32
Cochabamba	.17	.24	.29
La Paz	.14	.20	.23
Oruro	.16	.22	.27
Pando	.13	.18	.21
Potosí	.20	.28	.35
Tarija	.13	.17	.20
Santa Cruz	.12	.16	.18

Source: Based on information from United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Oficina Regional de Educación de la UNESCO para América Latina y el Caribe, *Informaciones estadísticas de la educación y análisis cuantitativo*, Santiago, Chile, July 1983, 38.

Table 6. Area and Output of Major Agricultural Commodities, 1984–88

Commodity	1984		1985		1986		1987		1988	
	Area [1]	Output [2]	Area [1]	Output [2]	Area [1]	Output [2]	Area [1]	Output [2]	Area [1]	Output [2]
Barley	90	72	95	76	90	84	86	67	80	75
Corn [3]	193	370	231	460	175	385	174	360	160	350
Potatoes	143	664	198	768	190	670	196	625	190	700
Rice	121	166	119	173	87	126	94	180	90	140
Wheat	89	69	92	68	82	60	77	50	88	60
Cotton	6	2	10	3	11	4	8	2	9	4
Soybeans	37	71	43	81	68	148	43	82	65	150
Sugar	77	182	78	182	83	190	73	167	62	140

[1] In thousands of hectares.
[2] In thousands of tons.
[3] Includes only yellow Cuban corn, not the more common white corn grown in Bolivia.

Source: Based on information from Gary C. Groves, "Bolivia: Agricultural Situation Report," Washington, March 30, 1988, 24–25.

Table 7. Exports and Imports of Major Agricultural Commodities, 1984–88
(in thousands of tons)

Commodity	1984		1985		1986		1987		1988	
	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports
Barley	25	0	20	0	25	0	25	0	25	0
Corn [1]	0	20	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0
Potatoes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rice	0	20	0	20	20	0	0	0	35	0
Wheat	274	0	330	0	270 [2]	0	280 [2]	0	280 [2]	0
Cotton	2	0.5	3	0.6	2	5	2	0	0	0
Soybeans	0	0	0	0	0	17	0	8	0	10
Sugar	0	17	0	6	0	18	0	35	10	0

[1] Includes only yellow Cuban corn, not the more common white corn grown in Bolivia.
[2] Includes wheat equivalent of flour.

Source: Based on information from Gary C. Groves, "Bolivia: Agricultural Situation Report," Washington, March 30, 1988, 24–25.

Table 8. Production and Exports of Petroleum and Natural Gas, 1980–85

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Production						
Crude petroleum [1]	1,384	1,286	1,418	1,288	1,211	1,152
Refined products [1]	1,503	1,352	1,373	1,242	1,234	1,220
Natural gas [2,3]	4,780	4,969	5,320	5,041	4,905	4,644
Exports						
Crude petroleum and refined products [1]	104	14	26	190	n.a.	n.a.
Natural gas [3]	2,040	2,196	2,297	2,227	2,210	2,216

n.a.—not available.

[1] In thousands of cubic meters.

[2] Includes rejected gas.

[3] In millions of cubic meters.

Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Profile: Bolivia, 1988-89,* London, 1988, 16.

Table 9. Production of Selected Minerals, 1986 and 1987
(in kilograms fine content)

Mineral	Total		Comibol [1]		Medium Miners		Small Miners [2]	
	1986	1987	1986	1987	1986	1987	1986	1987
Tin	10,382,618	8,128,044	4,231,972	383,810	3,203,470	2,237,330	2,947,176	5,506,904
Lead	2,750,707	9,042,420	1,319,540	1,005,040	364,188	6,534,190	1, 066,979	1,503,190
Zinc	33,296,046	39,122,311	3,915,402	2,899,810	28,294,999	35,275,567	1,085,645	946,934
Tungsten (wolfram) [3]	1,360,768	804,349	57,908	0	717,907	501,137	584,953	303,212
Silver	87,909	140,216	33,650	40,050	35,616	72,461	18,643	27,705
Bismuth	43,362	638	41,114	0	0	0	2,248	638
Antimony	10,243,182	10,635,422	0	0	7,190,394	6,827,222	3,052,788	3,808,200
Cadmium	33,846	14,620	18,770	14,620	15,076	0	0	0
Gold (in fine grams)	763,005	2,755,290	1,097	0	295,543 [4]	487,580 [4]	466,365 [4]	2,267,710 [4]

[1] Corporación Minera de Bolivia (Mining Corporation of Bolivia).
[2] Includes other exporters and mining cooperatives.
[3] In wolframite content.
[4] Gold purchased by Mining Bank of Bolivia (Banco Minero de Bolivia—Bamin) from gold cooperatives and small miners. Does not reflect total gold production.

Source: Based on information from United States, Department of Commerce, *Bolivia Minerals Report, FY 1987,* Washington, 1987, Appendix 2, 2, and Appendix 3, 3.

Table 10. Exports, Selected Years, 1980–87

Commodity	Value [1]				Percentage of Total Exports		Rate of Growth [2]			
	1984	1985	1986	1987 [3]	1980	1987 [3]	1984	1985	1986	1987 [3]
Traditional										
Metallic tin	191.0	134.0	55.0	13.0	23.1	2.3	9.1	-29.8	-59.0	-76.4
Tin concentrates	57.0	53.0	49.0	56.0	13.4	9.8	78.1	-7.0	-7.5	14.3
Silver	21.0	10.0	27.0	33.0	11.4	5.8	-63.8	-52.4	170.0	22.2
Zinc	37.0	29.0	28.0	33.0	3.6	5.8	12.1	-21.6	-3.4	17.9
Tungsten (wolfram)	19.0	10.0	7.0	5.0	4.5	0.9	-5.0	-47.4	-30.0	-28.6
Antimony	23.0	16.0	14.0	23.0	2.5	4.0	43.7	-30.4	-12.5	64.3
Other minerals	16.0	12.0	17.0	44.0	3.4	7.7	23.1	-25.0	41.7	158.8
Natural gas	376.0	373.0	329.0	248.0	21.3	43.6	-0.5	-0.8	-11.8	-24.6
Other hydrocarbons	13.0	2.0	4.0	8.0	3.3	1.4	-69.0	-84.6	100.0	100.0
Total traditional	753.0	639.0	530.0	463.0	86.5	86.3	-1.8	-15.3	-17.1	-12.5
Nontraditional										
Sugar	7.0	2.0	5.0	8.0	4.9	1.4	-41.6	-71.4	150.0	60.0
Coffee	7.0	14.0	13.0	11.0	2.0	1.9	-46.2	100.0	-7.1	15.4
Timber	6.0	7.0	23.0	31.0	2.9	5.4	-25.0	16.7	228.6	34.8
Other	9.0	11.0	67.0	56.0	4.5	9.8	-47.1	22.2	509.1	-16.4
Total nontraditional	29.0	34.0	108.0	106.0	14.3	18.5	-42.0	17.2	217.6	-1.9
TOTAL	782.0	673.0	638.0	569.0	100.0 [4]	100.0 [4]	-4.3	-14.1	-5.2	-10.7

[1] In millions of current United States dollars; cost, insurance, and freight.
[2] In percentages.
[3] Preliminary.
[4] Figures do not add to total because of rounding.

Source: Based on information from United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, *Estudio económico de América Latina y el Caribe, 1987: Bolivia,* Santiago, Chile, 1988, 19.

Table 11. Imports, Selected Years, 1980–87

Commodity	Value [1]				Percentage of Total Imports		Rate of Growth [2]			
	1984	1985	1986	1987 [3]	1980	1987 [3]	1984	1985	1986	1987 [3]
Consumer goods										
Nondurable	42.0	37.0	43.0	52.0	15.4	6.7	-8.7	-11.9	16.2	20.9
Durable	53.0	70.0	71.0	73.0	9.8	9.4	165.0	32.1	1.4	2.8
Total consumer goods	95.0	107.0	114.0	125.0	25.2	16.1	-43.9	12.6	6.5	9.6
Raw materials and intermediate goods										
For agriculture	18.0	15.0	22.0	22.0	1.6	2.8	63.6	-16.7	46.7	n.a.
For industry	152.0	185.0	200.0	245.0	30.3	31.5	-32.1	21.7	8.1	22.5
Construction materials	32.0	21.0	34.0	44.0	4.7	5.7	-25.6	-34.4	61.9	29.4
Fuel and lubricants	2.0	2.0	2.3	3.3	n.a.	0.4	-50.0	n.a.	15.0	43.5
Total raw materials and intermediate goods	204.0	223.0	258.3	314.3	36.6	40.4	-27.7	9.3	15.8	21.7
Capital goods										
For agriculture	14.0	22.0	45.0	38.0	2.0	4.9	100.0	57.1	104.5	-15.6
For industry	103.0	109.0	173.0	180.0	21.4	23.2	-33.9	5.8	58.7	4.0
Transport equipment	68.0	71.0	113.0	105.0	11.9	13.5	15.3	4.4	59.2	-7.1
Total capital goods	185.0	202.0	331.0	323.0	35.3	41.6	-16.6	9.2	63.9	-2.4
Other	5.0	21.0	10.0	15.0	2.4	1.9	-52.6	320.0	-52.4	50.0
TOTAL	489.0	553.0	713.3	777.3	100.0 [4]	100.0	-16.3	13.1	29.0	9.0

n.a.—not available.

[1] In millions of current United States dollars; cost, insurance, and freight.

[2] In percentages.

[3] Preliminary.

[4] Figures do not add to total because of rounding.

Source: Based on information from United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, *Estudio económico de América Latina y el Caribe, 1987: Bolivia*, Santiago, Chile, 1988, 20.

Table 12. Balance of Payments, 1983, 1985, and 1987
(in millions of United States dollars)

	1983	1985	1987
Exports of goods [1]	755.1	623.4	470.0
Imports of goods [1]	-496.0	-462.8	-658.0
Trade balance	259.1	160.6	-188.0
Exports of services	143.9	114.0	143.0
Imports of services	-647.3	-636.5	-572.0
Net private transfers	40.2	19.7	20.2
Net official transfers	65.2	59.8	109.0
Subtotal	-398.0	-443.0	-299.8
Current account balance	-138.9	-282.4	-487.8
Direct investment	6.9	10.0	22.0
Portfolio investment	-1.8	-0.9	n.a.
Other long-term capital	-221.2	-243.9	-90.8
Short-term capital	-113.5	-2.2	7.8
Capital account balance	-329.6	-237.0	-61.0
Errors and omissions	71.5	187.9	-1.2
Counterpart items	6.0	3.7	-23.8
Exceptional financing	668.4	352.6	441.8
Liabilities	-230.4	-62.7	40.9
Change in reserves [2]	-47.0	37.9	91.1

n.a.—not available.
[1] Free on board.
[2] Minus sign indicates increase in reserves.

Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Profile: Bolivia, 1988-89,* London, 1988, 23-24.

Table 13. Law-Making Process, 1989

Step	Description
Step 1	Bill is introduced in either chamber by senators, deputies, vice president, cabinet members, or president. House where bill is introduced becomes chamber of origin; "review chamber" is second chamber.
Step 2	Bill may be voted on or sent to committee for a report.
Step 3	If bill is sent to committee, committee must submit report on bill before whole chamber. Bill is either approved, rejected, or sent back to committee. Once a bill is rejected, it cannot be resubmitted in either chamber until next legislative year.
Step 4	Bill is introduced in review chamber, where it must go through same process.
Step 5a	If bill is modified in review chamber, it is sent back to first chamber.
Step 5b	If review chamber rejects bill, it cannot be reintroduced until next legislative year.
Step 6	If revisions of bill are not accepted by first chamber, president of either chamber must convoke a joint session within twenty days.
Step 7	A bill approved by both houses is sent to president, who has ten days to take action.
Step 8a	If president takes no action within ten days, bill becomes law. If legislative year ends before the ten days are over, president may introduce reforms in next legislative year.
Step 8b	If president makes modifications, bill must be sent back to chamber where it was introduced. If changes are approved by both houses, bill must be returned to the president for signing.
Step 9	If both chambers reject president's changes, a two-thirds majority can overturn a presidential veto.

Source: Based on information from Eduardo A. Gamarra, "Political Stability, Democratization, and the Bolivian National Congress," Pittsburgh, 1987.

Table 14. Composition of the National Congress, May 1989

	Senate	Chamber of Deputies	Total
MNR [1]	9	40	49
ADN [2]	8	38	46
MIR [3]	8	33	41
Condepa [4]	2	9	11
IU [5]		10	10
TOTAL	27	130	157

[1] Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionaria (Nationalist Revolutionary Movement).
[2] Acción Democrática Nacionalista (Nationalist Democratic Action).
[3] Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (Movement of the Revolutionary Left).
[4] Conciencia de la Patria (Conscience of the Fatherland).
[5] Izquierda Unida (United Left).

Table 15. Transition to Democracy, 1971–89

Period	Head of Government	Nature of Government	Source of Authority	Outcome of Government
1971–78	Hugo Banzer Suárez	Military, de facto	Coup d'état	Coup d'état
1978	Juan Pereda Asbún	-do-	-do-	-do-
1978–79	David Padilla Arancibia	-do-	-do-	Stepped down
1979	Walter Guevara Arze	Civilian, constitutional	Elected by Congress	Coup d'état
1979	Alberto Natusch Busch	Military, de facto	Coup d'état	Forced to step down
1979–80	Lidia Gueiler Tejada	Civilian, constitutional	Elected by Congress	Coup d'état
1980–81	Luis García Meza Tejada	Military, de facto	Coup d'état	Resigned
1981	Celso Torrelio Villa, Waldo Bernal Pereira, Oscar Pammo Rodríguez	-do-	Named by García Meza	-do-
1981–82	Celso Torrelio Villa	-do-	Named by military junta	-do-
1982	Guido Vildoso Calderón	-do-	Named by armed forces	Stepped down
1982–85	Hernán Siles Zuazo	Civilian, constitutional	Elected by Congress	Forced to call early elections
1985–89	Víctor Paz Estenssoro	-do-	-do-	Completed term
1989–	Jaime Paz Zamora	-do-	-do-	In power 1989

Table 16. Election Results, May 1989

Party	Candidates	Number of Votes	Percentage of Vote
MNR [1]	Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada Walter Guevara Arze	363,113	23.1
ADN [2]	Hugo Banzer Suárez Luis Ossio Sanjinés	357,298	22.7
MIR [3]	Jaime Paz Zamora Gustavo Fernández	309,033	19.6
IU [4]	Antonio Aranibar Walter Delgadillo	113,509	7.2
Condepa [5]	Carlos Palenque Jorge Cusicanqui Escobari	173,459	11.0
PS-1 [6]	Roger Cortez Jerjes Justiniano	39,763	2.5
MRTK [7]	Víctor Hugo Cárdenas Emmo Valeriano Thola	22,983	1.5
FULKA [8]	Genaro Flores Hermógenes Basualdo	16,416	1.0
FSB [9]	Rommel Pantoja Nestor W. Cerruto	10,608	0.7
MIN [10]	Luis Sandóval Morón Oscar García Suárez	9,687	0.6
Blank [11]	n.a.	68,626	4.4
Null [12]	n.a.	89,295	5.7
TOTAL		1,573,790	100.0

n.a.—not applicable.
[1] Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (Nationalist Revolutionary Movement).
[2] Acción Democrática Nacionalista (Nationalist Democratic Action).
[3] Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (Movement of the Revolutionary Left).
[4] Izquierda Unida (United Left).
[5] Conciencia de la Patria (Conscience of the Fatherland).
[6] Partido Socialista Uno (Socialist Party One).
[7] Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Katari (Túpac Katari Revolutionary Movement).
[8] Frente Única de Liberación Katarista (Sole Katarista Liberation Front).
[9] Falange Socialista Boliviana (Bolivian Socialist Falange).
[10] Movimiento de la Izquierda Nacionalista (Nationalist Leftist Movement).
[11] Ballots not filled out.
[12] Ballots nullified for some reason, e.g., defaced.

Source: Based on information from "Final Official Vote Count," *Presencia* [La Paz], May 28, 1989, 1.

Table 17. Major Army Equipment, 1989

Type and Description	Country of Origin	Inventory
Light tanks		
Alvis Scorpion	Britain	12
Steyr Sk 105mm	Austria	36
Armored combat vehicles		
EE-9 Cascavel	Brazil	24
Kürassier tank destroyers	West Germany	18
Armored personnel carriers		
M-113	United States	50
V-100 Commando	-do-	15
MOWAG Roland	France	24
EE-11 Urutu	Brazil	24
Artillery		
M-116 75-mm Pack howitzers	United States	6
M-101 105-mm howitzers	-do-	6
Bofors M-1935 75-mm guns	Sweden	10
FH-18 howitzers	n.a.	20
Recoilless rifles		
90-mm	United States	50
M-40A1 106-mm	-do-	n.a.
Mortars		
60-mm	-do-	n.a.
M-30 107-mm	-do-	n.a.
M-29 81-mm	-do-	250
Aircraft		
Beech Super King Air	-do-	1
Piper Cheyenne II	-do-	1
Casa C-212	Spain	1

n.a.—not available.

Source: Based on information from *The Military Balance, 1989-1990,* London, 1989, 184; and "World Defence Almanac," *Military Technology* [Bonn], 13, No. 1, January 1989, 42.

Table 18. Major Naval Equipment, 1989

Type and Description	Country of Origin	Inventory
Patrol craft		
Various sizes	n.a.	32
Piranhas	United States	8
Patrol launch	-do-	1
Hospital-type patrol launch	n.a.	2
Sea-going vessel	Venezuela	1
Hydrographic research ship	n.a.	1
Transport ship	n.a.	1
Aircraft		
Cessna 402	United States	1
Cessna 206	-do-	1

n.a.—not available.

Source: Based on information from *The Military Balance, 1989-1990,* London, 1989, 184; and "World Defence Almanac," *Military Technology* [Bonn], 13, No. 1, January 1989, 42

Table 19. Major Air Force Equipment, 1989

Type and Description	Country of Origin	Inventory
Fixed-wing fighters		
AT-33N	Canada	14
F-86F Sabre	United States	4
Hughes 500M	-do-	10
Counterinsurgency		
AT-6G	n.a.	12
PC-7	Switzerland	12
Fixed-wing utility		
Cessna	United States	24
Trainers		
T-41D Mescalero	-do-	6
Cessna 172	-do-	3
Cessna 310	-do-	2
Cessna A-152	-do-	12
T-23 Uriapuru	Brazil	18
SF-260CB	Italy	6
SF-260M	-do-	3
PC-7	Switzerland	24
T-33A	United States	18
Transports		
L-188 Electra	-do-	1
Sabreliner 65	-do-	1
Super King Air	-do-	3
Cessna	-do-	3
C-130 Hercules	-do-	6
C-47	-do-	8
IAI-201 Arava	Israel	4
F27-400 Friendship	Netherlands	6
L-100-30 Hercules	United States	1
Convair 440	-do-	4
PC-6B Turbo Porters	West Germany	17
Reconnaissance		
Learjet 25B	United States	2
Cessna 402B	-do-	1
Helicopters		
UH-1H	-do-	7
Bell 212	-do-	2
SA-315B/HB-315B	France	8
Artillery		
20-mm Oerlikon guns	Switzerland	50

n.a.—not available.

Source: Based on information from *The Military Balance, 1989-1990*, London, 1989, 184; and "World Defence Almanac," *Military Technology* [Bonn], 13, No. 1, January 1989, 42.

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Chapter 2

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Glossary

ayllu—A self-governing and land-owning peasant community in Bolivia's highlands. May refer to either a village, a kinship group, or a clan-like organization, usually based on collective agriculture. Although a pre-Columbian term, *ayllu* has been used as a synonym for contemporary highland peasant communities (*comunidades*).

boliviano—Bolivia's official unit of currency. Replaced the peso on January 1, 1987. In 1988 the exchange rate was B2.3 = US$1. Readoption of the boliviano (Bolivia's currency prior to January 1963) in January 1987 redressed the damage done to the currency by hyperinflation.

Cambas—Natives of the lowlands who often look with disdain on highlanders (Kollas—*q.v.*).

cholo—A term that has a variety of definitions and social implications. During colonial times was equivalent to mestizo but has evolved to include persons of mixed or pure Indian ancestry who are trying to move up the social and economic ladder. *Cholos* speak Spanish in addition to an Indian tongue.

compadrazgo—Literally, copaternity. A system of ritual coparenthood that links parents, children, and godparents in a close social or economic relationship.

corregidor—The official, usually a white or *cholo,* in preindependence Bolivia charged with administering local Indian affairs.

encomienda(s)—A system whereby rights over Indian labor and tribute were granted to individual colonists (*encomenderos*) in return for assuming the responsibility of supervision and religious education of the Indians.

fiscal year (FY)—Calendar year.

gross domestic product (GDP)—A measure of the total value of goods and services produced by the domestic economy during a given period, usually one year. Obtained by adding the value contributed by each sector of the economy in the form of profits, compensation to employees, and depreciation (consumption of capital). The income arising from investments and possessions owned abroad is not included, hence the use of the word *domestic* to distinguish GDP from GNP (*q.v.*).

gross national product (GDP)—Total market value of all final goods and services produced by an economy during a year. Obtained by adding GDP (*q.v.*) and the income received from abroad by residents less payments remitted abroad to nonresidents.

import-substitution industrialization—An economic development strategy that emphasizes the growth of domestic industries, often by import protection using tariff and nontariff measures. Proponents favor the export of industrial goods over primary products.

informal sector—Unofficial sector of underground economic activity. In Bolivia, consisted principally of coca cultivation, cocaine trafficking, and contraband, employing two-thirds of the work force.

International Monetary Fund (IMF)—Established along with the World Bank (*q.v.*) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency affiliated with the United Nations that takes responsibility for stabilizing international exchange rates and payments. The main business of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members when they experience balance of payments difficulties. These loans often carry conditions that require substantial internal economic adjustments by the recipients.

Kollas—Term for native residents of the Altiplano, including the city of La Paz, used somewhat disdainfully by native lowlanders, called Cambas (*q.v.*).

machismo—Cult of male dominance, derived from the word *macho,* meaning male.

minifundios—Very small landholdings, legally held, allowing only a bare existence.

mita—A compulsory labor system implemented by the Spaniards to work the mines. Required that all able-bodied Indian men present themselves periodically for short periods of paid work in the mines. Was abused by inhumane treatment of the conscripts, arbitrary extensions of the service period, and depletion of individual communities of their adult males.

Paris Club—A Paris-based organization that represents commercial banks in the rescheduling of national debts.

pulpería—Originally, a company store; later, a state-subsidized merchandise store selling goods at stable prices to miners and other labor groups.

rosca—A derogatory term for the national oligarchy whose basis of power was strongly shaken by the 1952 Revolution. Designated in particular the supportive group of lawyers and politicians who acted as administrators for the ruling elite.

state capitalism—A development model or strategy centered on the state, which directly controls and manages, through government agencies and public mixed corporations, most of the basic industry and infrastructure and uses incentives or disincentives

to guide growth in the private sector in accordance with development priorities.

terms of trade—Number of units that must be given up for one unit of goods by each party, e.g., nation, to a transaction. The terms of trade are said to move in favor of the party that gives up fewer units of goods than it did previously for one unit of goods received, and against the party that gives up more units of goods for one unit of goods received. In international economics, the concept of "terms of trade" plays an important role in evaluating exchange relationships between nations.

value-added tax (VAT)—An incremental tax applied to the value added at each stage of the processing of a raw material or the production and distribution of a commodity. It is calculated as the difference between the product value at a given state and the cost of all materials and services purchased as inputs. The value-added tax is a form of indirect taxation, and its impact on the ultimate consumer is the same as that of a sales tax.

World Bank—Informal name used to designate a group of three affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much easier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD through loans and assistance designed specifically to encourage the growth of productive private enterprises in less developed countries. The president and certain senior officers of the IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The three institutions are owned by the governments of the countries that subscribe their capital. To participate in the World Bank group, member states must first belong to the IMF (*q.v.*).

Index

Published Country Studies

(Area Handbook Series)

550-65	Afghanistan	550-87	Greece
550-98	Albania	550-78	Guatemala
550-44	Algeria	550-174	Guinea
550-59	Angola	550-82	Guyana and Belize
550-73	Argentina	550-151	Honduras
550-169	Australia	550-165	Hungary
550-176	Austria	550-21	India
550-175	Bangladesh	550-154	Indian Ocean
550-170	Belgium	550-39	Indonesia
550-66	Bolivia	550-68	Iran
550-20	Brazil	550-31	Iraq
550-168	Bulgaria	550-25	Israel
550-61	Burma	550-182	Italy
550-50	Cambodia	550-30	Japan
550-166	Cameroon	550-34	Jordan
550-159	Chad	550-56	Kenya
550-77	Chile	550-81	Korea, North
550-60	China	550-41	Korea, South
550-26	Colombia	550-58	Laos
550-33	Commonwealth Caribbean, Islands of the	550-24	Lebanon
550-91	Congo	550-38	Liberia
550-90	Costa Rica	550-85	Libya
550-69	Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast)	550-172	Malawi
550-152	Cuba	550-45	Malaysia
550-22	Cyprus	550-161	Mauritania
550-158	Czechoslovakia	550-79	Mexico
550-36	Dominican Republic and Haiti	550-76	Mongolia
550-52	Ecuador	550-49	Morocco
550-43	Egypt	550-64	Mozambique
550-150	El Salvador	550-35	Nepal and Bhutan
550-28	Ethiopia	550-88	Nicaragua
550-167	Finland	550-157	Nigeria
550-155	Germany, East	550-94	Oceania
550-173	Germany, Fed. Rep. of	550-48	Pakistan
550-153	Ghana	550-46	Panama

550-156	Paraguay
550-185	Persian Gulf States
550-42	Peru
550-72	Philippines
550-162	Poland
550-181	Portugal
550-160	Romania
550-37	Rwanda and Burundi
550-51	Saudi Arabia
550-70	Senegal
550-180	Sierra Leone
550-184	Singapore
550-86	Somalia
550-93	South Africa
550-95	Soviet Union
550-179	Spain
550-96	Sri Lanka
550-27	Sudan
550-47	Syria
550-62	Tanzania
550-53	Thailand
550-89	Tunisia
550-80	Turkey
550-74	Uganda
550-97	Uruguay
550-71	Venezuela
550-32	Vietnam
550-183	Yemens, The
550-99	Yugoslavia
550-67	Zaire
550-75	Zambia
550-171	Zimbabwe